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1 Introduction
We present a proof of unconditional security of a practical quantum key distribution protocol. It is an
extension of a previous result obtained by Mayers [1, 2], which proves unconditional security provided that
a perfect single photon source is used. In present days, perfect single photon sources are not available and,
therefore, practical implementations use either dim laser pulses or post-selected states from parametric
downconversion. Both practical signal types contain multi-photon contributions which characterise the
deviation from the ideal single-photon state. This compromise threatens seriously the security of quantum
key distributions when the loss rate in the quantum channel is high [3, 4, 5]. Security of such practical
realisation has nevertheless been proven in [6] against restricted type of eavesdropping attacks. The
salient idea used in [6] is that data associated with multiple photon signals are revealed to a possible
eavesdropper, without the legitimate user’s knowledge. We show here that this model can be combined
with Mayers’ proof. The resulting extension guarantees unconditional security of a realistic quantum key
distribution protocol against an enemy with unlimited classical or quantum computational power.
By now, Mayers’ proof has been followed up by other proof of the security of ideal single-photon
quantum key distribution [7, 8]. Security assuming some restrictions on eavesdropper’s attack can be
found in [9, 10, 11]. Security of protocols in which honest participants use trusted quantum computers
can be found in [12].
Unconditional security of a protocol means a security against a cheater with unlimited computational
power, quantum or classical. In other words, it means that there is no condition on the cheater. It does not
mean that there is no condition on the apparatus used by the honest participants. This last interpretation
would be equivalent to say that we know nothing about the protocol that is actually implemented. So,
each proof of unconditional security must use a different type of assumptions on these apparatus. Mayers’
original proof applies to an unrestricted eavesdropper’s attack on the quantum signals, but assumes the
source used in the protocol is perfect. In particular, it assumes that the source emits single photon
pulses. In this paper, we present a derivation of the proof in which the last assumption is relaxed: we still
consider sources that perform perfect polarisation encoding, but each signal carries now a random number
of photons in the ideal polarisation mode. The random variables giving the numbers of photons in the
pulses are assumed to be identically and independently distributed, and we require that an upper-bound
on the probability that a pulse contains several photons is known. As in Mayers’ original paper, there is
no assumption on the quantum channel nor on the detection unit, except that, given an input quantum
state of any signal, the detector’s probability of detecting a signal does not depend on the choice of the
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measurement basis. A more detailed discussion about assumptions in quantum cryptography together
with a new approach to this problem, especially the problem of an untrusted BB84 source, can be found
in [13].
This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part we define the assumptions of our proof, the
protocol we refer to and the security notion. We then give the result of our proof which give the precise
quantitative meaning of our security proof together. In that step the necessary parameters of the protocol
leading to secure quantum key cryptography are given. We illustrate the results by giving the asymptotic
formulas for the limit of long keys which show, how many secure bits the protocol will obtain for a given
error rate of an experimental set-up as a function of the source parameters and the error rate. In the
second part, we present the detailed proof of the statements of the first part. We have chosen to give
all details of this proof to make it self contained, although it follows closely Mayers original work. The
readers are invited to refer to the original paper [2] where a simpler situation was analysed, to get an
insight into the main idea of the proof.
2 Security in Quantum Key Distribution
The roˆle of key distribution between two distant legitimate parties, traditionally called Alice and Bob,
is to generate a shared random binary string, called the private key, that is guaranteed to be known
only by the legitimate parties. A non-authorised party, traditionally called Eve, should not be able to
obtain any information about the private key. More precisely, for any eavesdropping strategy Eve chooses,
the conditional entropy of the private key, given the data Eve acquires during the protocol, should be
very close to the maximum entropy, corresponding to a uniformly and independently distributed key.
One requirement for this is that the conditional probability of the private key given Eve’s data must be
very close to the uniform distribution. Note that it is not sufficient to impose that the private key be
independent of the data Eve acquires: a key distribution protocol that returns a specific value for the
private key with high probability does not provide any privacy, even if Eve is inactive during the key
distribution.
Quantum key distribution protocols do not allow Alice and Bob to share a private key in all cir-
cumstances. For example, Eve can usually block signals between the two parties. But even if the signals
arrive, Alice and Bob cannot always create a secure key using them. As shown in [5], it is in principle not
possible to create a secure key with the BB84 protocol (using ideal signals) once the error rate exceeds
25 %. This is true for any post-processing of the data in the sense of advantage distillation or similar
ideas. It is therefore characteristic for any full protocol (including the classical post-processing of the
data) that it can deliver a secure private key only as long as the parameters describing the transmission
of the quantum channel (like the error rate) are within a certain parameter region.
Any protocol therefore provides a validation test that tells whether a key can be generated with
unconditional privacy. A key is created only if the test is passed. Otherwise the session is abandoned.
Naturally, one would like to find an entropic bound given the validation test is passed. However, it is
known that such a bound is inappropriate for the protocol we consider in this paper (see for example
[7]): there are simple attacks that give full knowledge about the private key, although with very small
probability of success. It is therefore important to choose a good measure of privacy which nevertheless
reflects our basic intuition.
We follow Mayers’ proof and define formally a key even in the cases that the validation test is
not passed. For this purpose Bob formally chooses with uniform distribution a binary sequence as key
whenever the test fails. We then bound Eve’s entropy on this always defined key, conditioned on her
knowledge, to be arbitrarily close to the maximal value. Naturally, in that case Alice and Bob do not
share a key, but this is unimportant since they are aware of it.
This choice of security notion assures that Eve’s conditional entropy is close to the maximal amount,
2
but this situation can arise from two different scenarios: either Eve applies only gentle eavesdropping,
which passes the validation tests and gives her basically no information, or she applies massive eaves-
dropping, which basically all the time fails the validation test, but in the unlikely event of passing the
test, it might reveal substantial amount of information. Nevertheless, in both cases the key will be safe,
since in the first scenario Eve has no information on the key, while in the second case, the probability of
success will be, in a quantified way, extremely low.
Another important aspect of security of quantum key distribution protocols is the integrity or the
faithfulness of the distributed key. We must require that whatever Eve does, it is very unlikely that Alice
and Bob fail to share an identical private key while the validation test is passed. One way this situation
might arise is the error correction procedure (which is a typical ingredient of a full protocol) failing to
correct all errors, for example because of an unusual error distribution.
Finally, we consider families of protocols for which a parameter, quantifying the amount of a resource
used in a protocol, characterises its security. Usually, the higher this security parameter’s value is, the
higher is the level of security, but also the amount of a resource required by the protocol. In the protocol
we consider the number of quantum signals sent by Alice as security parameter.
We now give a formal definition of security. For this we will introduce some notation. A random
variable will always be denoted by a bold letter, and values taken by this random variable by the corre-
sponding plain letter. Only discrete random variables will be considered in this paper. The probability
distribution of a random variable x is denoted by Px, i.e. Px(x) = Pr(x = x) is the probability that
x takes the value x. The joint distribution of two random variables x and y is denoted by Pxy, i.e.
Pxy(x, y) = Pr(x = x,y = y). The conditional probability of x given an event E with positive probabil-
ity is denoted by Px | E , i.e. Px | E(x) = Pr(x = x|E). The conditional probability of x given that y takes
a value y is denoted by Px |y=y whenever Py(y) > 0, i.e. Px |y=y(x) = Pr(x = x|y = y) = Pxy(x,y)Py(y) ,
whenever Py(y) is positive. Let f be a function defined on the image of x. When no confusion is possible,
the notation f will be adopted to denote the random variable f(x).
We will denote by ~κ the random variable giving the private key generated in a key distribution
session. The key is a string of m bits where m is a positive integer specified by the legitimate users. That
is ~κ takes value in {0, 1}m. We denote by valid the random variable giving the outcome of the validation
test and by share the random variable telling whether Alice and Bob share an identical private key. Given
an eavesdropping strategy chosen by Eve, we denote by v the random variable giving collectively all data
Eve gets during this key distribution session. Henceforth, given the eavesdropping strategy adopted by
Eve, v is called the view of Eve, and we will denote by Z the set of all values v may take.
We adopt the following definition of security for quantum key distribution protocols.
Definition 1 Consider a quantum key distribution protocol returning a key ~κ ∈ {0, 1}m regardless of the
outcome of the validation test, where the length of the key, m, is fixed and chosen by the user. We say
that the protocol has (asymptotic) perfect security if and only if:
• the protocol is parametrised by a parameter N taking value in IN called the security parameter, and
• there exists two functions ǫ1, ǫ2 : IN × IN → R+ such that ǫ1(N,m) and ǫ2(N,m) are vanishing
exponentially as N grows (i.e. there exist α > 0, β > 0, Nmin ∈ IN and a function f : IN → R+
such that ∀N > Nmin, ǫ1(N,m), ǫ2(N,m) < e−αNβf(m)) , and
• there exists a function N0 : IN→ IN such that, for any strategy adopted by Eve,
∀m, ∀N ≥ N0(m),
(privacy) H(~κ|v) ≥ m− ǫ1(N,m) (1)
(integrity) Pr(¬share and valid) ≤ ǫ2(N,m) (2)
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where v is Eve’s view given her strategy, and H(~κ|v) Def= −∑~κ,v |P~κv(~κ,v)>0 P~κv(~κ, v) log2 P~κ |v=v(~κ)
is the Shannon entropy [14, 15, 16] of the key ~κ given Eve’s view v.
We will show that the protocol presented in the next section will be secure according to this definition.
In particular, this means, that the protocol creates a key of length m out of N signals. Then, by choosing
N large enough for fixed values of m, we can always assure that Eve’s conditional entropy is arbitrarily
close to the maximum amount (privacy). Additionally, with a probability arbitrarily close to unity, Alice
and Bob share the key given that the validation test is passed (integrity).
3 The protocol
In this section, the quantum key protocol considered in this paper is described. It is an adaptation of the
BB84 [17] protocol which takes into account the usage of an imperfect photon source. Note that the usage
of imperfect source has been discussed as early as the first experimental implementation of BB84 [18] in
the framework of restricted types of eavesdropping attacks. We first make precise which assumptions on
the quantum channel we adopt in this paper. Then we give a formal description of the protocol.
3.1 Required technology
In the original proof [2], Mayers considered a practical realisation of quantum key distribution prone to
noise and signal loss. However, the legitimate parties were assumed to be using a perfect single photon
source – a source that emits exactly one photon in the chosen polarisation state. No restriction was
imposed on the photo-detection unit used in the protocol, except that given an incoming signal, the
probability of detection was required to be independent of the basis used to measure the signal. It was
argued in [2] that Eve can take advantage of a detection unit in which the probability of detection depends
on the basis chosen for the measurement, and we will adopt in this paper the same restriction regarding
the detection unit.
The new feature in this paper is that we allow the use of imperfect source of photons in the following
sense: given a polarisation state specified by the user, the source emits photons exactly in the specified
polarisation state, but in a mixture of Fock states. That is, the source emits n photons in the given
polarisation state with probability pn, where n ∈ IN and p0, p1, p2, . . . is a probability distribution. The
user does not have to know how many photons were actually emitted. The only restriction we impose is
that an upper bound Mmax on the number of emitted signals containing several photons is known within
a confidence limit given by the (small) probability Pr(M > Mmax). We restrict ourselves to provide
this bound for signals with identically and independently distributed multi-photon probability pM . In
that case we can choose Mmax = (pM + τM )N and obtain Pr(M > Mmax) < exp(−τ2MN), as explained
below. Other methods for providing Mmax and Pr(M > Mmax) can be used, where the corresponding
terms replace the here derived and easily identifiable expressions in the subsequent results.
The authors believe this relaxation of requirement has practical importance, since single photon
sources are not yet available, due to technological limitations. Furthermore, it has been pointed out [5]
that in most experimental implementations of quantum key distribution, the quantum signals transmitted
by the legitimate parties can be described as mixtures of Fock states.
As an example, consider a practical source emitting a coherent state of light in a given polarisation:∣∣α〉 = e− |α|22 ∞∑
j=0
αj√
j!
∣∣ j〉 (3)
where
∣∣ j〉, j ∈ IN is the number state – or Fock state – describing a state of j photons in the considered
polarisation (Therefore, for α 6= 0, a coherent state has an indefinite number of photons). If we write
α = |α|eiφ, |α| and φ are called amplitude and phase of the coherent pulse, respectively.
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In general, the phase of a pulse is completely unknown, or can be rendered random thanks to a
phase randomisation technique. Since the phase is then uniformly distributed, a pulse state in a given
polarisation is described by the density matrix:
ρsource =
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
∣∣ |α|eiφ〉〈|α|eiφ ∣∣dφ (4)
=
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
e−|α|
2
∞∑
j,j′=0
|α|j+j′√
j!j′!
eiφ(j−j
′)
∣∣ j〉〈j′ ∣∣dφ (5)
=
∞∑
j=0
e−|α|
2 |α|2j
j!
∣∣ j〉〈j ∣∣ (6)
Therefore, the signals emitted by a coherent source of light becomes a classical mixture of Fock states
due to the lack of a phase reference. Another example of practical source is a source emitting thermal
states of light. Such states are already mixtures of Fock states. The above de-phasing argument applies
in general for any signal state. Further studies of source characterisation can be found in [19].
We summarise the assumptions on the quantum setup adopted throughout this paper:
• The legitimate parties use a source of photons that sends a mixture of Fock states ρ =∑∞n=0 pn∣∣n〉〈n ∣∣
in the polarisation state exactly as specified by the user. The numbers of photons in the pulses
emitted by the source are assumed to be identically and independently distributed. The upper
bound Mmax on the emitted number of multi-photon signals during the protocol is known by the
legitimate parties to hold except with a negligible probability Pr(M >Mmax).
• The legitimate parties use a photo-detection unit such that for any given signal, the probability of
detection is independent of the choice of the measurement basis.
• The signals and Alice’s and Bob’s polarization bases are chosen truly at random.
• Eve cannot intrude Alice’s or Bob’s apparatus by utilizing the quantum channel. She is restricted
to interaction with the signals as they pass along the quantum channel.
3.2 The protocol
The quantum key distribution protocol under consideration based on Bennett and Brassard’s BB84 [17]
is defined. It comprises three stages: agreement on parameters of the protocol and security constants, the
transmission of quantum signals, and the execution of a classical protocol together with the validation
test.
Pre-agreement
1. Alice and Bob specify:
• m, the length (in bits) of the private key to be generated.
• N , the number of quantum signals to be sent by Alice. This integer is the security
parameter of the protocol.
• δ, the maximum threshold value for the error rate for the validation test.
• rmin, the minimum threshold value for Bob’s detection rate (1 > rmin > Mmax/N).
• pR, the proportion of the shared bits that must be publicly announced for the validation
test (0 < pR ≤ 1/2).
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• τec, τf , τM , τˆ , and τp the security constants of the protocol. They are small strictly
positive real numbers chosen so that δ + τec < 1, δ + τf < 1, rmin > Mmax/N , τˆ <
1−pR
2 ,
τp < 1.
Quantum Transmission
2. Alice and Bob initialise the counter of the signals as i = 0 and Bob initialises the set of detected
signals as D = {}. Then until the pre-agreed number of signals have been sent (i = N), the
following is repeated
(a) Alice and Bob increment i by one.
(b) Alice picks randomly with uniform distribution a basis ai ∈ {+,×} and a bit value gi ∈
{0, 1}.
(c) Alice makes her source emit a pulse of photons in the state |Ψ(gi, ai)〉 where |Ψ(0,+)〉,
|Ψ(1,+)〉, |Ψ(0,×)〉 and |Ψ(1,×)〉 correspond to single photon states of polarisation an-
gles 0, π/2, π/4 and −π/4, respectively. We recall that {∣∣Ψ(0,+)〉, ∣∣Ψ(1,+)〉} forms an
orthonormal basis of Hphoton, the Hilbert space for single photon polarisation states, and∣∣Ψ(0,×)〉 = ∣∣Ψ(0,+)〉+∣∣Ψ(1,+)〉√
2
,
∣∣Ψ(1,×)〉 = ∣∣Ψ(0,+)〉−∣∣Ψ(1,+)〉√
2
.
(d) Bob measures Alice’s pulse in the basis bi where bi ∈ {+,×} is chosen randomly at each
time. If at least one photon is detected, the index i is added to the set D of detected
signals’ indexes, and the outcome of the measurement is recorded as hi ∈ {0, 1} (if the
detection unit finds photons in both modes hi = 0, 1, the value for hi is chosen randomly
in {0, 1} by Bob). If no photon is detected at all, hi is assigned the value ⊥.
Note that the random choice of basis in step (d) might be provided by a beamsplitter (or a coupler)
followed by two measurement setups, each measuring the photons in the basis + and × respectively.
It might also be given by an external random number generator acting on a polarisation rotator.
Classical part
We denote by n the number of signals detected by Bob, i.e. n = |D|, and by ~a = (a1, . . . , aN ) ∈
{+,×}N , ~b = (b1, . . . ,~bN) ∈ {+,×}N , ~g = (g1, . . . , gN) ∈ {0, 1}N and ~h = (h1, . . . , hN ) ∈ {0, 1,⊥
}N the outcome of the quantum transmission (Step 2). Restrictions of these vectors onto some
specified subset X ⊂ {1, . . . , N} will be denoted by ~a(X),~b(X), ~g(X),~h(X).
3. Bob announces the set of detected signals by D to Alice.
4. Bob picks up randomly a subset of signals which will be revealed for the validation test R ⊂
{1, . . . , N} , where each position i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is put in R with probability pR.
5. Bob announces the revealed set R and the measurement basis of all signals ~b to Alice.
6. Bob announces the bit values of the test set ~h(D ∩R) to Alice.
7. Alice computes the set of corresponding signals Ω = {i ∈ D : ai = bi}, the set of corresponding
test signals T = Ω ∩ R and the set of untested corresponding signals E = Ω ∩ R. We denote
|E| by l.
8. Alice announces the polarisation basis of all of her signals ~a, thus announces implicitly Ω and
E as well. The bitstreams ~g(E) and ~h(E) are usually called sifted keys.
9. Alice chooses a linear error correcting code [14, 15] capable of correcting ⌈(δ+ τec)(1−pR)|Ω|⌉
errors in E. Its parity check matrix, F , is a r × l binary matrix, where r is the number of
redundant bits required to correct ⌈(δ + τec)(1− pR)|Ω|⌉ errors in l bits using the linear error
correcting code. Alice announces the syndrome ~s = F~g(E) (mod 2) to Bob.
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10. Receiving the parity check matrix F and the syndrome ~s, Bob runs the error correction on his
sifted key ~h(E) and obtains ~h′(E). If there are less than ⌈(δ + τec)(1 − pR)|Ω|⌉ errors in E,
Bob corrects successfully all the errors and obtains ~g(E), i.e. ~h′(E) = ~g(E).
11. Alice picks up randomly with uniform distribution a m× l binary matrix K to which we will
refer as the privacy amplification matrix. Alice announces K publicly.
12. Receiving the privacy amplification matrix K, Bob computes ~κ′ = K~h′(E) (mod 2).
Validation test
Alice runs the validation test.
13. Alice tests whether the following conditions are all satisfied:
• Bob’s detection rate is greater than rmin, i.e.
n > rminN. (7)
• The size of D complies to the following inequalities:
l̂min
2
≥ (δ + τf )(1− pR)n, (8)
m+ r ≤ l̂min
[
1−H1
[
2(δ + τf )
1−pR
2 n
l̂min
]
− τp
]
, (9)
where
l̂min =
(
1− pR
2
− τˆ
)
(n−Mmax) (10)
is a probabilistic lower bound on the number of signals on the set E which is due to single
photon signals.
• The number of errors in the tested set T is lower than the maximally allowed value. More
precisely,
|{i ∈ T : gi 6= hi}| < d, (11)
where d = δ|Ω|pR.
The validation test is passed if and only if all the conditions above are satisfied. The private
key is the bitstream obtained by Alice as follows:
14. Alice computes the private key, defined as:
• ~κ = K~g(E) (mod 2) if the validation test is passed,
• a m-bit string ~κ chosen randomly with uniform distribution each time the validation test
is not passed.
This protocol defines a key regardless whether the validation test is passed. The choice of the
security constants used in the protocol is clarified in the following section.
Note: The matrix K can be prepared in advance, and Eve could know its form before the transmission
of the quantum signal. More precisely, Alice and Bob could pre-agree on some set of matrices K for
various values of m, and l. It is the special property 4 of F and K which is required here, and which will
be introduced and explained in the section 5.3. This property is satisfied automatically if we choose K as
random binary matrix, as specified in the protocol, and the constraint of Eq. 9 is satisfied. Our security
proof can therefore immediately adapted to other choices of F and K together with their respective
constraints replacing Eq 9 to satisfy the underlying required property 4 of section 5.3.
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4 Security of the protocol
In this section we present the security statement for the protocol described in 3.2. If follows the structure
of Def. 1. The proof of the security statement is given in the remainder of the paper.
Theorem 1 The expected conditional Shannon entropy of the key ~κ returned by the protocol described
in Section 3.2 given Eve’s view v is lower bounded, for any N > 0, by
H(~κ|v) ≥ m− ǫ1(N,m) (12)
where the difference ǫ1(N,m) between the bound and the maximal value m is given by
ǫ1(N,m) = 2
(
m+
1
ln 2
)
h(δ, τf , pR, n) + 2
√
2
(
m+
1
ln 2
)
mh(δ, τf , pR, n) +
+ m
(
e−2τ
2
MN + e−2τˆ
2(rminN−Mmax) + 2−τp(
1−pR
2 −τˆ)(rminN−Mmax) +
+
√
g(δ, τf , pR, n)
)
. (13)
where
g(δ, τf , pR, n) = exp
[
− 1
2δ + τf
τ2f
p2R
4
rminN + 2
(
τf
2δ + τf
)2]
, (14)
h(δ, τf , pR, n) = 2
√√
g(δ, τf , pR, n) +
√
g(δ, τf , pR, n). (15)
Besides, the conditional probability that Alice and Bob share an identical private key given that the
validation test is passed is lower bounded for any N > 0 by:
Pr(¬share and valid) ≤ ǫ2(N,m), (16)
where
ǫ2(N,m) = min
τΩ∈(0,1/2)
[
e−
1
2δ+τec
τ2ecp
2
R(
1
2−τΩ)rminN+2( τec2δ+τec )
2
+ e−2τ
2
ΩrminN
]
. (17)
The functions ǫ1(N,m) and ǫ2(N,m) decrease exponentially with N , as required by the definition
of security (Definition 1).
The parameters, the number of emitted signals N out of which the key of length m is created, are
chosen in accordance with the performance of the set-up used for preparation, transmission and detection
of the quantum signals in view of Equation 9. As the number of these transmissions goes to infinity, we
can neglect statistical fluctuations of the signal properties and describe the ratio between detected signals
and sent signals by a detection rate pD = n/N and rmin = n/N . All security constants τec, τf , τp, τ˜ and
τM can be chosen to be arbitrarily small, and the asymptotic key generation rate out of one bit of the
sifted key reads is given as the length of the sifted key over that of the final key in terms of the observed
error rate δ as
m
l
=
(
1− pM
pD
)[
1−H1
(
2δ
1− pMpD
)]
−H1(δ) . (18)
Here we used we used asymptotic equalities for the sifted key length l ≃ 1−pR2 n and ⌈(δ+τec)(1−pR)|Ω|⌉ ≃⌈δl⌉. Furthermore, we made use of the Shannon limit [14] r(⌈δl⌉, l) ≃ lH1(δ).
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The overall rate of secure key bits per sent signal m/N can be calculated directly by multiplying
Eq. (18) with the asymptotic formula
l
N
≃ 1− pR
2
pD . (19)
The ratio G between key length and received signals m/n can be obtained by multiplication with l/n ≃
(1− pR)/2. Moreover, in the limit of arbitrary long keys we can use the limit pR → 0 since even testing
a ’small’ fraction of the long key will have statistical significance sufficient for our purpose. Examples of
the resulting values of G as a function of distance are shown in Figure 1 for various wavelength. To put
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Figure 1: Asymptotic gain rates using a simulation with the help of experimental parameters. The
parameters are drawn from Bourennane et al. [20] for 1.5µm, Marand and Townsend [21] for 1.3µm and
Townsend [22] for 0.8µm.
our results into context, we relate our results in Fig. 2 to those obtained for the limited security level of
security against individual attacks. Note that the difference between the two results is not substantial.
More importantly, the difference might be due to the proof technique used in our result. Our results
should therefore not be interpreted as to claim that coherent attacks give more information to Eve than
individual attacks do. Furthermore, we lay out the relevant bounds on improved security proofs. The
rate is bounded due to the photon number statistics of the source, resulting in
Gbound =
1
2
(pD − pM ) (20)
as shown in [6]. We recover this bound by setting δ = 0 in our asymptotic bound.
The distance, over which secure communication is possible, is bounded by the detector noise. As
shown in Brassard et al. [5], the minimal transmission efficiency FWCP in the situation of Poissonian
photon number distribution of the source is given by
FWCP ≈ 2
√
dB
ηB
(21)
where dB is the dark count probability of the detector per signal slot and ηB is the single photon detection
efficiency of the detector. The corresponding distance (given the parameters of the experiment) is shown
in Fig. 2.
We have therefore a clear picture of the rates and distances which are shown to be secure by our proof
(the area below the curve ’coherent’ in Fig. 2), those that are shown to be insecure [5, 6] (the area outside
of the two bound curves). Note that the area between the ’coherent’ line and the two bounds is the area
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Figure 2: We use the parameters of Bourennane et al. [20] for 1.5µm to show the secure gain rate per
time slot using our results (’coherent’). For comparison, the corresponding results for security against
individual attack [6] are given. The rate is bounded due to the Poissonian photon number distribution of
the source and the loss in the quantum channel (’rate bound’) as shown in [6]. The combination of the
source statistics, the loss and detector dark counts, there is a fundamental bound on the distance over
which secure QKD could be proven with more advances proofs than ours, as shown in Brassard et al. [5]
of the unknown. Future classical protocols taking on the error correction and privacy amplification tasks
from our protocol in a different way (but leaving the quantum transmission and measurement untouched)
and/or improved security proofs can proclaim more of this area ’secure’.
5 Proof of the main result
The structure of the proof follows. In the first section, an important feature of the distribution of errors
during the quantum transmission is presented. As an immediate consequence we can proof the integrity
of the protocol, meaning that when the validation test is passed, Bob shares the private key with Alice
with high probability. The second section deals with the multi-photon signals’ issue. It gives an upper
bound on the number of bits a spy can get by an attack called photon number splitting attack. In the
third section, we explore the method of privacy amplification implemented by binary matrices and taking
into account linear error correction tools. It turns out that the privacy of the protocol is equivalent to
the “privacy” in a modified protocol . This equivalence is proved in section 5.4, and the corresponding
mathematical model is provided in section 5.5. Finally, the proof of privacy of the modified protocol is
given.
There are several points where our proof deviates from that of Mayers [2]. Most notably this
difference can be seen in 5.3 where the deviation between the proofs shows up quantitatively . However,
changes in the protocol (in our protocol the number of transmitted signals is fixed which are not necessarily
all detected, and not the number of detected signals, as in [1]) make it necessary to check in detail that
the basic proof idea of Mayers carries through.
10
5.1 On the distribution of errors and the proof of integrity
We start with a property regarding the distribution of errors which is based solely on basic probability
theory. It allows to make statements on the key derived from the set E based on the counting of errors
in the set T . As an immediate application this property allows us to proof the integrity of the QKD
protocol. Note, that in a practical run of quantum key distribution, we could omit this estimation, since
we can learn the exact number of errors in E during the later stage of error correction. However, the kind
of estimation presented here serves a second purpose, which is used later on in our proof. This purpose
is to make a statement about the eavesdropping strategy and its expected error rate from the observed
error rate. Let us explain this by an example: If Eve implements an intercept/resend attack where she
measures Alice’s bit in a randomly chosen signal basis and she resends a state to Bob corresponding
to her measurement result, then she might be lucky an choose always the correct signal basis. In that
(unlikely) event, she would cause no errors while obtaining full information on the key. Indirectly, the
property below quantifies the idea that the observed numbers of errors will belong to a typical run of the
protocol.
Property 1 Let S be a set of finite size, s. Let C be a randomly chosen subset of S. The random
variable giving the choice of C is denoted by C. Let A and B be two subsets of S chosen randomly as
follows:
1. Each element in S is put (exclusively) in A or B or neither of these sets with respective probabilities
pA, pB and 1 − (pA + pB). That is, the random variables giving the set to which the indexes in S
belong to are independently and identically distributed.
2. Furthermore, the random variables giving the set to which indexes in S belong to are independent
of the random variable C.
We denote by A, B the random variables giving the set A and B, respectively. Then for any positive
real numbers δ, ǫ such that 0 < δ < δ + ǫ < 1,
Pr(|A ∩C| < δspA and |B ∩C| ≥ (δ + ǫ)spB) ≤ f(δ, ǫ, pA, pB, s) (22)
where
f(δ, ǫ, pA, pB, s) = exp
[
− 1
2δ + ǫ
ǫ2(min{pA, pB})2s+ 2
(
ǫ
2δ + ǫ
)2]
. (23)
Proof For any subset C of S, given C = C, each element of C is either in A or in B with respective
probabilities pA and pB.
Now c = |C| is either smaller than ⌊(δ + ǫ2 )s⌋ or bigger than ⌈(δ + ǫ2 )s⌉.
• If c ≤ ⌊(δ+ ǫ2 )s⌋, let C′ = C ∪D where D is some subset of S \C such that |C′| = c′ = ⌊(δ+ ǫ2 )s⌋.
Then C ⊂ C′, and
Pr(|B ∩C| ≥ (δ + ǫ)spB|C = C) ≤ Pr(|B ∩C| ≥ (δ + ǫ)spB|C = C′). (24)
Furthermore,
(δ + ǫ)spB =
δ + ǫ
δ + ǫ2
pB(δ +
ǫ
2
)s ≥ (1 + ǫ
2δ + ǫ
)pBc
′, (25)
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and using the Property 16 from the Appendix for the set B and the set C′,
Pr(|B ∩C| ≥ (δ + ǫ)spB|C = C′) ≤ Pr(|B ∩C| ≥ (1 + ǫ
2δ + ǫ
)pBc
′|C = C′) (26)
≤ exp
[
−2
(
ǫpB
2δ + ǫ
)2
c′
]
(27)
≤ f(δ, ǫ, pA, pB, s), (28)
since (min{pA, pB})2 ≤ p2B and c′ ≥
(
δ + ǫ2
)
s− 1. Of course this implies that
Pr(|A ∩C| < δspA and |B ∩C| ≥ (δ + ǫ)s|C = C) ≤ f(δ, ǫ, pA, pB, s). (29)
• If c ≥ ⌈(δ + ǫ2 )s⌉, then
δspA =
δ
δ + ǫ2
pA(δ +
ǫ
2
)s ≤
(
1− ǫ
2δ + ǫ
)
pAc (30)
and using the Property 16 for the set A and the set C,
Pr(|A ∩C| < δspA|C = C) ≤ Pr(|A ∩C| <
(
1− ǫ
2δ + ǫ
)
pAc|C = C) (31)
≤ exp
[
−2c
(
pAǫ
2δ + ǫ
)2]
(32)
≤ f(δ, ǫ, pA, pB, s), (33)
since (min{pA, pB})2 ≤ p2A ≤ 1 and c ≥
(
δ + ǫ2
)
s >
(
δ + ǫ2
)
s− 1. Again, this implies that
Pr(|A ∩C| < δspA and |B ∩C| ≥ (δ + ǫ)s|C = C) ≤ f(δ, ǫ, pA, pB, s). (34)
We conclude that for any C,
Pr(|A ∩C| < δspA and |B ∩C| ≥ (δ + ǫ)s|C = C) ≤ f(δ, ǫ, pA, pB, s). (35)
Thus
Pr(|A ∩C| < δspA and |B ∩C| ≥ (δ + ǫ)spB)
=
∑
C
PC(C) Pr(|A ∩C| < δspA and |B ∩C| ≥ (δ + ǫ)spB|C = C) (36)
≤ f(δ, ǫ, pA, pB, s), (37)
which concludes the proof. ✷
An immediate consequence of property 1 is that the error rate in the sifted key is not significantly
higher than the error rate observed by Alice and Bob during the validation test. This implies the integrity
of the protocol, as defined in Def. 1, or more formally:
Property 2 The joint probability that Alice and Bob fail to share an identical key and that the validation
test is passed is lower bounded by:
Pr(¬share and valid) ≤ ǫ2(N,m) (38)
where
ǫ2(N,m) = min
τΩ∈(0,1/2)
[
e−
1
2δ+τec
τ2ecp
2
R(
1
2−τΩ)rminN+2( τec2δ+τec )
2
+ e−2τ
2
ΩrminN
]
. (39)
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Proof We have seen that Alice and Bob run an error-correcting scheme capable of correcting ⌈(δ +
τec)(1−pR)|Ω|⌉ errors in E. Thus Bob shares exactly the same key after the error correction step if there
are less than (δ + τec)(1 − pR)|Ω| errors in E. Given that Ω = Ω where Ω ⊂ {1, . . . , N}, the probability
that the validation test passes while there are more than (δ + τec)(1− pR)|Ω| errors in E is bounded by:
Pr(P(T , δ|Ω|pR) ∧ ¬P(E, (δ + τec)|Ω|(1 − pR)))
= Pr(|T ∩C| < δ|Ω|pR and |E ∩C| ≥ (δ + τec)|Ω|(1− pR)) (40)
≤ f(δ, τec, pR, 1− pR, |Ω|)
≤ exp
[
− 1
2δ + τec
τ2ecp
2
R|Ω|+ 2
(
τec
2δ + τec
)2]
. (41)
using the above property for S = Ω and where C is the random variable giving the set of discrepancies
between Alice’s bits ~g(Ω) and Bob’s bits ~h(Ω) on Ω. Indeed, R is independent of C, and consequently
the random variables giving the set (E or T ) to which the indexes in Ω belong to are independently and
identically distributed (Pr(i ∈ E|i ∈ Ω) = (1 − pR) and Pr(i ∈ T |i ∈ Ω) = pR), and independent of
C. The above implies that the probability that the error correction fails to reconcile Alice’s and Bob’s
sifted keys while the validation test is passed is upper-bounded by an exponentially decreasing function
of |Ω|. Now, each index in D has probability 1/2 to be put in the set Ω. Let τΩ be a constant obeying
0 < τΩ < 1/2. Suppose we are given that n = n for some positive integer n. Using Property 16 in the
Appendix, the probability that there are less than (12 − τΩ)n is bounded by:
Pr(|Ω| ≤ (1
2
− τΩ)n |n = n) ≤ e−2τ2Ωn. (42)
Therefore,
Pr(¬share ∧ valid)
≤ Pr
(
P(T , δ|Ω|pR) ∧ ¬P(E, (δ + τec)|Ω|(1− pR))
∣∣∣n > rminN) (43)
≤ Pr
(
P(T , δ|Ω|pR) ∧ ¬P(E, (δ + τec)|Ω|(1 − pR))
∣∣∣ |Ω| ≥ (1
2
− τΩ)n , n > rminN
)
+
+ Pr
(
|Ω| ≤ (1
2
− τΩ)n
∣∣∣n > rminN)
≤ e− 12δ+τec τ2ecp2R( 12−τΩ)rminN+2( τec2δ+τec )
2
+ e−2τ
2
ΩrminN , (44)
since n > rminN if the validation test is passed. Since this equations has to hold for all values τΩ ∈
(0, 1/2), we have especially
Pr(¬share ∧ valid) ≤ min
τΩ∈(0,1/2)
[
e−
1
2δ+τec
τ2ecp
2
R(
1
2−τΩ)rminN+2( τec2δ+τec )
2
+ e−2τ
2
ΩrminN
]
. (45)
This concludes the proof.
5.2 On multiple photon signals
Let A = {1, . . . , N} be the set of indexes of all signals Alice sent. Each signal Alice sends contains zero,
one or more photons, with respective probabilities denoted by pV , pS and pM . Alice does not know how
many photons she actually emits in each individual pulse. However, a potential eavesdropper Eve can
learn the actual number of emitted photons without disturbing the quantum signal, thanks to a quantum
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non demolition measurement (we assume no technological limitation for the enemy). Let’s denote by V ,
S and M the set of indexes of signals containing zero, one and more photons, respectively. Therefore,
V ∪ S ∪M = A and the set V , S and M are disjoint. We will denote by Σ = (V, S,M) this partition of
A. We will deal with the worst case scenario in which the partition Σ is unknown to Alice, but perfectly
known to Eve.
In the following sections, a lower bound on the number of bits in the sifted key not arising from
multi-photon signals (that is |E∩M |) will be required. Most of practical implementations of quantum key
distribution today use a quantum channel with high loss rate, due to technological limitations. This loss
rate must be taken into account to establish the required lower bound. For, Eve could replace secretly
the quantum channel by a perfect quantum channel without loss (again, we assume no technological
limitation for Eve). Eve might then stop signals containing only one photon, as long as the resulting loss
rate of the quantum channel does not exceed significantly the expected loss rate of the original channel.
By doing so, Eve increases the proportion of bits arising from multi-photon signals in the sifted key,
without being noticed by the legitimate users. Now if a signal sent by Alice contains several photons,
Eve can split off one photon from the pulse without disturbing the polarisation of the remaining photons.
She stores the stolen photon until bases are announced and learns deterministically the corresponding
bit by measuring it in the correct basis. This attack is usually referred to as the photon number splitting
attack [5, 6]. It is in view of this attack (in a slightly different context) that we will need to estimate the
number of bits in the sifted key that are not arising from multi-photon signals.
It is possible to give a probabilistic lower bound on the number of bits in the sifted key that are
not arising from multiple photon signals, provided that an upper-bound on the probability pM is given.
More precisely,
Property 3 Let’s denote by l̂ the number of bits in E that are not arising from multi-photon signals, i.e.
l̂ = |E ∩M |. We denote by l̂ = |E ∩M | the corresponding random variable. We recall that we defined
the random variable l̂min as:
l̂min =
[
1− pR
2
− τˆ
]
(n−Mmax) (46)
where the security constants τM and τˆ are strictly positive real number such that Mmax/N < rmin and
1−pR
2 − τˆ > 0. Then the joint probability that n > rminN and that l̂ < l̂min is bounded by:
Pr(l̂ ≤ l̂min ∧ n > rminN) ≤ e−2τˆ2(rminN−Mmax) + e−2τ2MN (47)
Proof We consider the worst case scenario in which all losses and errors are caused by Eve’s
intervention on the quantum channel. Obviously, in order to minimise l̂, Eve intervene in such a way
that M ⊂ D.
Suppose we are given that Bob detected n = n signals and that M = M . Then there are at least
n− |M | signals in D that are not arising from multi-photon pulses. Now, each of these non-multiphoton
signals in D has probability 1−pR2 of being put in the set E. Therefore, the probability that there are less
than
[
1−pR
2 − τˆ
]
(n− |M |) signals in the sifted key not arising from multi-photon signals is bounded by:
Pr
(
l̂ ≤
[
1− pR
2
− τˆ
]
(n− |M |)
∣∣∣n = n,M =M) ≤ e−2τˆ2(n−|M|) (48)
using Property 16 in the Appendix.
Now, the marginal probability that Alice sent more than (pM + τM )N multi-photon signals is
bounded using Property 16 in the Appendix:
Pr(|M | ≥ (pM + τM )N) ≤ e−2τ
2
MN (49)
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since each signal Alice sends has probability pM of being in M .
Note that
[
1−pR
2 − τˆ
]
(n− |M |) ≥ l̂min whenever |M | ≤ (pM + τM )N . Therefore, given that n = n,
the probability that there are less than l̂min signals in the sifted key that were not emitted with several
photons is bounded by:
Pr(l̂ ≤ l̂min|n = n) ≤ Pr(|M | ≥ (pM + τM )N |n = n) +
+ Pr(l̂ ≤ l̂min and |M | ≤ (pM + τM )N |n = n) (50)
≤ Pr(|M | ≥ (pM + τM )N |n = n) + e−2τˆ2(n−(pM+τM)N). (51)
Multiplying both side by Pn(n) and summing over n > rminN , we get:
Pr(l̂ ≤ l̂min ∧ n > rminN) ≤ Pr(|M | ≥ (pM + τM )N ∧ n > rminN) +
+
∑
n>rminN
e−2τˆ
2(n−(pM+τM)N)Pn(n) (52)
≤ Pr(|M | ≥ (pM + τM )N) + e−2τˆ2(rminN−(pM+τM)N) (53)
≤ e−2τ2MN + e−2τˆ2(rminN−Mmax), (54)
which concludes the proof. ✷
5.3 On privacy amplification
In this section, diverse notions used in connection with privacy amplification are defined. In particular,
we define d̂w, the minimal weight of a privacy amplification code, used in conjunction with an error-
correcting code and an imperfect source. Finally, an important probabilistic lower bound on this weight
is proved. This bound will be used in the last part of the proof. It is this minimal weight which will keep
track of the multi-photon signals. The changed estimation of the minimum weight is therefore the most
important change of this proof as respect to Mayers proof [2], although other details need to be adapted.
The privacy amplification is specified by am× l binary matrix K. The linear error correction code is
specified by a r× l binary parity check matrix F . We introduce some notations. Let G be the (r+m)× l
matrix:
G =
(
F
K
)
. (55)
For any matrix A, A(i) denotes its i-th row and A
(i) its i-th column.
Recall that l̂ = |E ∩M | is the number of signals in E that are not arising from pulses sent with
several photons.
Let Ĝ be the (r + m) × l̂ matrix obtained from G by removing the columns G(i), i ∈ M ∩ E,
corresponding to the multi-photon signals. Equivalently, Ĝ is the matrix formed by the l̂ columns of G
corresponding to signals in E ∩M . Let Gˇ be the (r +m)× (l − l̂) matrix formed by the (l − l̂) columns
G(i), i ∈ E ∩M . Similarly, we define F̂ , K̂ obtained from F , K by removing the l− l̂ columns F (i), G(i),
i ∈ E ∩M respectively. And Fˇ , Kˇ are the matrices formed by the l − l̂ columns F (i), G(i), i ∈ E ∩M
respectively. Thus
Ĝ =
(
F̂
K̂
)
, Gˇ =
(
Fˇ
Kˇ
)
. (56)
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Let Ĝ be the set of linear combinations of rows of Ĝ. Let Ĝ∗ be the set of linear combinations of
rows of Ĝ which contain at least one row of K̂, i.e.
Ĝ∗ =
{
r+m∑
i=1
ziĜ(i) (mod 2) : ~z ∈ {0, 1}r+m, zj = 1 for at least one j ∈ {r + 1, . . . r +m}
}
. (57)
We define Ĉ as:
Ĉ =
{
~x ∈ {0, 1}l̂ : Ĝ~x = ~0
}
=
(
Ĝ
)⊥
. (58)
Note that Ĉ⊥ = Ĝ. We define the minimum weight of Ĝ∗ as the integer:
d̂w = min
~x∈Ĝ∗
w(~x). (59)
Equivalently,
d̂w = min
~u∈{0,1}r,~v∈{0,1}m\{~0}
w(~uT F̂ + ~vT K̂). (60)
The minimum weight is an important characterisation of the combination of the error correction code
matrix F and the privacy amplification matrixK. It denotes the minimum number of signals contributing
to key bits or parities of sets of key bits after taking into account publicly known parities from the error
correction code and the knowledge from multi-photon signals. We need a probabilistic bound on this
quantity. Here we will derive it for the case of random coding where K is a random binary matrix, but we
would like to point out that other suitable choices for K are indeed possible, and might lead to increased
performance of the protocol in terms of the yield of secure bits. The important property to be fulfilled is
property 4.
We approach the bound on d̂w via the following lemma taken directly from [2]:
Lemma 1 Let k, a and b be positive integers. Let A be any a× k binary matrix. Let B be a b× k binary
matrix, picked at random with uniform distribution. We denote by B the corresponding random variable.
Let dAB be the minimum weight of linear combinations of rows of A and B that contain at least one row
of B:
dAB = min
~u∈{0,1}a,~v∈{0,1}b\{~0}
w(~uTA+ ~vTB). (61)
Then for any positive real number x such that x/k < 1/2 and for any positive real number τ ,
a+ b
k
≤ 1−H1(x
k
)− τ ⇒ Pr(dAB < x) ≤ 2−τk (62)
where H1 is the binary entropy function.
Proof of the lemma Let C be the (a+ b)× k matrix defined by:
C =
(
A
B
)
. (63)
Define the real number R as R = kH−11 (1 − a+bk − τ) where H−11 is the inverse function of the
restricted bijective function H1 : [0,
1
2 ] → [0, 1]. Assume that a+bk ≤ 1 −H1(xk ) − τ . This implies that
x ≤ R. Let B be the sphere in {0, 1}k centred at the zero string ~0 and of radius R. For i ∈ {1, . . . b},
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let’s denote by qi the probability that there exists ~z ∈ {0, 1}a+i−1 such that B(i) +
∑a+i−1
j=1 zjC(j) is in
B (equivalently, qi is the probability that the coset B(i) + Span
({C(j)}j≤a+i−1) intersects B). Then
Pr(dAB < x) ≤ Pr(dAB < R) (64)
= q1 + q2(1− q1) + · · ·+ qb
b−1∏
i=1
(1− qi) (65)
≤
b∑
i=1
qi, (66)
since the probability that dAB < R is the probability that, if one picks successively at random the rows
B(1), B(2), . . . , B(b), at some step i ∈ {1, . . . , b} the set B(i) + Span
({C(j)}j≤a+i−1) intersects B.
Now,(
B(i) + Span
({C(j)}j≤a+i−1)) ∩ B 6= ∅ ⇔ B(i) ∈ {~x+ Span ({C(j)}j≤a+i−1) : ~x ∈ B} , (67)
where the size of the last set is upper bound by |B| × |Span ({C(j)}j≤a+i−1) |. Since B(i) is chosen
randomly out of 2k strings,
qi ≤
|B| × |Span ({C(j)}j≤a+i−1) |
2k
(68)
≤ 2a+i−1−k|B|, (69)
and using the binomial tail inequality (Property 13):
|B| =
⌊R⌋∑
q=0
(
k
q
)
≤ 2kH1(R/k) for R
k
≤ 1
2
, (70)
we find
qi ≤ 2a+i−1−k+k(1−
a+b
k
−τ) = 2−b−τk+i−1, (71)
thus
Pr(dAB < R) ≤
b∑
i=1
qi = 2
−b−τk
b−1∑
i=0
2i ≤ 2−τk. (72)
Therefore, the expected probability that dAB ≤ R is smaller than 2−τk. Thus,
a+ b
k
≤ 1−H1(x
k
)− τ ⇒ Pr(dAB < x) ≤ 2−τk (73)
which concludes the proof of the lemma. ✷
This bound allows us to prove the following crucial property:
Property 4 Let d̂w be the random variable giving the minimum weight d̂w defined above. Then, given
that n = n for some positive integer n and l̂ ≥ l̂min,
Pr
( d̂w
2
< (δ + τf )
1− pR
2
n
∣∣∣ l̂ ≥ l̂min, n = n, valid = True) ≤ 2−τp l̂min (74)
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Proof Given that n = n and l̂ = l̂ ≥ l̂min, note that the random variable K̂ is uniformly distributed
and independent of other variables. Passing the validation test in the protocol requires that the constraint
9
m+ r
l̂min
≤ 1−H1
[
2(δ + τf )
1−pR
2 n
l̂min
]
− τp (75)
is satisfied. Since the validation test is passed, especially Eqn. (8), the argument of H1(x) satisfies
x < 1/2. Moreover, we have m+r
l̂
≤ m+r
l̂min
and 1 −H1(2(δ+τf )
1−pR
2 n
l̂
) − τp ≥ 1 −H1(2(δ+τf )
1−pR
2 n
l̂min
) − τp.
Therefore, the number of rows of F̂ and K̂ verify:
m+ r
l̂
≤ 1−H1
[
2(δ + τf )
1−pR
2 n
l̂
]
− τp . (76)
We can therefore apply the above lemma for A = F̂ , B = K̂, k = l̂ and x = 2(δ + τf )
1−pR
2 n. We
obtain that:
Pr
(
d̂w < 2(δ + τf )
1− pR
2
n
∣∣∣ l̂ = l̂ ≥ l̂min, n = n, valid = True) ≤ 2−τp l̂ (77)
or,
Pr
( d̂w
2
< (δ + τf )
1− pR
2
n
∣∣∣ l̂ ≥ l̂min, n = n, valid = True) ≤ 2−τp l̂min (78)
which concludes the proof of the property. ✷
5.4 Reduction to a modified situation
In this section, a modified situation of the original protocol is defined. This modified situation does not
correspond to a key distribution, but nevertheless, a “key” is defined at Alice’s side. Surprisingly, the
“privacy” in the modified situation implies the privacy of the original protocol, and this implication is
proved.
5.4.1 Equivalence with the modified protocol
We first describe the modified protocol which is similar to the original protocol, except that Bob measures
the photons in the sifted set E in the wrong bases (therefore Bob does not share the private key with
Alice). We show that the security of the modified protocol is equivalent to the security of the original
protocol.
In the subsequent discussion, we will consider – without loss of generality as far as the security of
the protocol is concerned – that Bob’s choice of measurement bases ~b and the set R are provided by a
randomising box at Bob’s side: the box generates randomly a choice for R and for ~b at the beginning of
the protocol. It then provides Bob with the generated data as required by the protocol, that is, it gives
~b during step 2 and R at the step 4 to Bob. We now define the intermediate protocol as follows. In the
intermediate protocol,
• Alice behaves exactly as in the original protocol.
• Bob’s randomising box generates R and ~b as before, but gives ~˜b instead of ~b to Bob at step 2, where:
b˜i
Def
=
{
bi if i ∈ R
¬bi if i /∈ R. (79)
The box announces R to Bob at step 4 as in the original protocol.
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• Bob behaves exactly as in the original situation, except that, in step 5, after he learned the choice
for R, he computes and announces ~b rather than ~˜b.
Therefore, in the modified protocol, Bob measures Alice’s signals in the bases ~˜b and announces
~b. The underlying idea is that the original and the modified protocols are identical, except that Bob
measures the signals indexed in R in the wrong bases (without actually knowing R). Consequently,
Alice’s sifted key and Bob’s sifted key are uncorrelated: Bob does not share the key with Alice. The
private key is only defined in Alice’s hand. Therefore, this situation does not describe a key exchange.
It is only an abstract stepping stone towards the proof of unconditional privacy, thanks to the following
property:
Property 5 Whichever strategy a potential eavesdropper Eve chooses, the random variable giving jointly
Alice’s private key and Eve’s view has the same probability distribution in both protocol.
Proof In the following, we say that a random variable in the original protocol and the corresponding
random variable in the modified protocol are indistinguishable if and only if their probability distribu-
tions are identical. A quantum system whose state is not a priori known is characterised by an ensemble
description. Given a system having probability pi to be in the state ρi for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, its ensemble
description is the list {(pi, ρi)}i, that is, the list of its possible states together with the corresponding
probabilities. We say that a quantum system in the original protocol and the corresponding quantum
system in the modified protocol are indistinguishable if and only if their ensemble descriptions are iden-
tical. Throughout the proof of this property, we consider an arbitrary but fixed strategy adopted by
Eve. By strategy, we mean the algorithm or the “program” followed by Eve to eavesdrop. Therefore, if
Eve is given the same input, she will act identically. We have to prove that the data Eve accesses and
the private key Alice gets in the original protocol and in the modified protocol are indistinguishable if
Eve follows this given strategy. Recall that in the original protocol, Eve learns the values of D, R, ~b,
~h(D ∩ R), P(T, d), ~a, F , ~s and K via the public discussions. Eve may also attempt to eavesdrop the
quantum channel. If a pulse contains several photons, Eve might keep one photon and store it until bases
are announced, thus obtaining deterministically the corresponding bit. Eve may also entangle a quantum
probe P to Alice’s single photon signals, and measure P after public discussions. She might also stop
some single photon signals, leaving pulses in vacuum state to Bob. Let (A,B,C, . . . ,D) be a set of
random variables (and/or quantum systems) in the original protocol. Let (A′,B′,C′, . . . ,D′) be the set
of corresponding random variables (and/or quantum systems) in the modified protocol. Note that one
can show that the set (A,B,C, . . . ,D) is indistinguishable from the set (A′,B′,C′, . . . ,D′) by showing
successively that: A and A′ are indistinguishable. Given A and A′ take the same value (denoted as
A = A′), B and B′ are indistinguishable. Given A = A′ and B = B′, C and C′ are indistinguishable,
etc. Now:
• The choice for ~a, ~g, ~b and R are indistinguishable in both protocol. Given that the choice for ~a,
~g, ~b and R takes the same values in both protocol, Alice announces the same ~a in step 8 and Bob
announces the same ~b and R in step 5.
• Given that Alice’s choice for ~a and ~g take the same value in both protocol, Alice’s quantum signals
are indistinguishable in both protocol.
• Given that Alice’s quantum signals are in the same state in both protocols, Eve acts on them in the
same manner: the interaction of the quantum signals with Eve’s apparatus and the probe P remains
the same. Thus the resulting quantum signals (disturbed and/or suppressed by Eve) received by
Bob are indistinguishable in both protocol. Likewise, the resulting states of Eve’s apparatus and
probe P are indistinguishable in both protocol. Naturally, after the above coupling, the density
matrix describing P does not depend on Bob’s choice of bases or outcomes of the measurements.
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• We assumed that given a quantum signal, the probability that Bob detects at least one photon in
this signal is independent of his choice of basis. Therefore, given that Alice’s quantum signals are
identical in both protocol, the set of detected signals in the modified protocol is indistinguishable
from the set D of detected signals in the original protocol. Given that the choice for ~b and R is the
same in both protocol, since b˜i = bi for i ∈ R, the measurement outcome hi in the modified protocol
is indistinguishable from the hi in the original protocol, for i ∈ R. Therefore Bob’s announcement of
~h(R∩D) in the modified protocol is indistinguishable from its counterpart in the original protocol.
• As a result, the sets Ω, T and E computed by Alice in the modified protocol are indistinguishable
from the corresponding sets computed in the original protocol.
• The above implies that the outcome of the test P(T, d) is indistinguishable in both protocol.
• In both protocol, Alice’s choices for K and F are indistinguishable. Given ~g, E and F take the
same value in both protocol, Alice announces the same syndrome ~s.
• The private data Eve wishes to discover is the private key ~κ = K~g(E) (mod 2) in both situation.
Therefore, the public announcements, Eve’s apparatus and probe, and Alice’s private key are indis-
tinguishable in both protocol. Thus the random variables giving the results Eve gets from measuring her
apparatus and probe are indistinguishable in both situation. This concludes the proof. ✷
5.4.2 Further reduction
The previous section has shown that it is sufficient to prove privacy of the modified protocol to prove that
the original protocol is secure. It turns out that it is simpler to prove security for the modified protocol
since Bob has no information about the private key. The privacy of the modified protocol can be proved
even in the following situation where:
• Alice announces generously ~g(E) after she announces ~a in step 8, and
• Bob announces generously ~h(D) in step 3 (i.e. before announcement of the revealed set R), instead
of announcing ~h(D ∩R) in step 6.
Of course, this can only weaken the security of the modified protocol, and the security of the resulting
protocol implies the security of the original protocol.
Provided the randomising box is not corrupted and the random choice of R and ~b are announced
honestly in step 5 by the box, the security of the modified protocol can be proved even if we furthermore
assume that Bob is corrupted by Eve. That is, Bob tells Eve the output ~˜b of the randomising box in step
2 and Eve and Bob together make the measurement they want on the quantum signals sent by Alice.
Bob then announces D and ~h(D) as told by Eve in step 3. Thus we can regard the couple Eve-Bob as a
single enemy, provided that the randomising box is not corrupted and that the public announcement of
R and ~b in step 5 is made directly by the box.
Of course, ~h(T ) should be close enough to ~g(T ) so that the couple Eve-Bob passes the test. The
eavesdropping fails if Alice declares ¬P(T, d). After the public discussion, Eve may execute another
measurement on the residual state of the photons to refine her information.
5.4.3 Reduction related to multiple photon signals
We now present a reduction related to the multiple photon signals. By assuming that the enemy has
full knowledge about the multiple photon signals prior to any public announcement, this reduction will
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allow us to work with a simpler situation in which the enemy is performing a conditional measurement
on single photon signals only.
Since Eve has no technological limitation, we must assume that Eve-Bob have perfect detectors.
We also consider the worst case scenario in which Eve replaces the quantum channel by a perfect one.
Therefore, Eve-Bob are cheating when the set D containing all signals in which Bob officially detected at
least one photon is not equal to S ∪M . Eve-Bob choose the set D at their convenience, while ensuring
that the observed transmission rate n/N is not significantly lower than the expected transmission rate.
Now, if Alice emits a signal of index i with several photons, Eve-Bob may pick up one photon from the
signal and measure it in basis b˜i, giving the outcome hi. Then they measure the remaining photons in
the pulse in the other basis ¬b˜i, yielding a result h′i. The bit hi allows Eve-Bob to pass the test for the
index i, if i ∈ T . After announcement of Alice’s basis ai, Eve-Bob knows whether ai = b˜i or ai = ¬b˜i. In
either case, Eve-Bob learn deterministically gi (since gi = hi if ai = b˜i and gi = h
′
i if ai = ¬b˜i). That is,
for any signal i emitted with several photons, Eve-Bob can learn deterministically gi while passing the
test for the index i with certainty, if i ∈ T . In order to take into account this extra knowledge gained
by Eve-Bob from the multi-photon signals, we consider a slightly worse scenario. We henceforth assume
that:
• In addition to sending the photon pulses exactly as described previously, Alice’s source tells secretly
Eve-Bob the partition Σ = (V, S,M), the number of photons ni in each pulse i in M (collectively
denoted by ~n(M)), Alice’s bases ~a(M) and Alice’s bits ~g(M). These secret announcements are
made at the same time as the source emits the quantum signals and we denote them collectively
by M = (Σ, ~n(M),~a(M), ~g(M)).
Again, this assumption can only weaken the security of the protocol. Now given M, Eve-Bob can
re-create the signals sent by Alice on M . That is, provided Eve-Bob learn M, we can assume that
Eve-Bob receive only photon pulses that are in S, without modifying the security of the protocol.
To summarise, the security of the original key distribution protocol is implied by the security of the
modified protocol in which Bob is corrupted by Eve and in which:
• M = (Σ, ~n(M),~a(M), ~g(M)) are given secretly to Eve-Bob during step 2.
• Eve-Bob receive only photon pulses that are in S.
• Eve-Bob must announce publicly ~h(D) in step 3.
• Bob’s randomising box is not corrupted and announces publicly R and ~b honestly in step 5.
5.5 Mathematical model of eavesdropping in the modified situation
We define the view of Eve-Bob as the set of all data Eve-Bob acquired during the modified protocol.
The random variable describing this view is denoted by v, and takes value in the set of all possible view
values, Z. Following our model, the view v has the following form:
v = (M,D,~h(D),R,P , j) (80)
where
• M = (Σ,~n(M),~a(M),~g(M)) is the random variable giving collectively the secret announcements
of Alice’s source (Σ = (V ,S,M)),
• P = (~a,~g(E),F ,K,~s) is the random variable giving collectively Alice’s public announcements,
and
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• j is the random variable giving collectively the rest of classical data Eve-Bob obtain by performing
measurements on the quantum signals. The structure of j depends, of course, on Eve-Bob’s attack.
Note that from the beginning Eve-Bob learn ~˜b from the random number generating box. Since the
privacy results in the modified situation will not depend on ~˜b, we will consider ~˜b as a parameter of the
protocol, known by everybody. This is why the corresponding random variable is omitted from v.
We now present the formalism to describe the whole situation just after Eve-Bob learnM from the
source, that is before they determine D. Just after Eve-Bob get an outcome M = M, the situation is
modeled as follows:
The system as seen by Eve-Bob is described in a Hilbert space Hsys = HC ⊗HS where HC is the
Hilbert space describing the classical data ~a, ~g, R, F , K processed by Alice or the randomising box and
HS is the Hilbert space describing single photon signals in S.
We will denote by c = (~a,~g,R,F ,K) the random variable giving collectively ~a, ~g, R, F , K. Each
possible value c = (~a,~g,R, F,K) for c is represented by a state (i.e. a normalised vector)
∣∣ c〉 ∈ HC such
that the set {∣∣ c〉}c forms an orthonormal basis of HC . The Hilbert space HS is HS = ⊗i∈SHphoton. The
single photon polarisation Hilbert space Hphoton has been defined previously.
For any quantum system described in a Hilbert space H, the state of the system is fully defined
by a Hermitian non negative matrix ρ of unit trace called the density operator. When the system has
probability pi to be in the state
∣∣Ψi〉 for i = 1, 2, . . . , k (we say the system is in a statistical mixture
of states), then the corresponding density operator is ρ =
∑k
i=1 pi
∣∣Ψi〉〈Ψi ∣∣. The result of a general
measurement on a system described in H can be seen as an outcome of a random variable q where q
is the measured physical quantity. A general measurement q on a system described in a Hilbert space
H is described by a positive operator valued measure (POVM henceforth) {(q, Fq)}q∈Q where Q is the
set of all possible outcomes for q. It is a set of Hermitian non negative operators Fq on H such that∑
q∈Q Fq = 1H. Then the probability that the measurement yields a particular value q is given by
Pq(q) = Tr(Fqρ) (81)
where ρ is the density operator of the system. For any q ∈ Q, the Hermitian nonnegative operator Fq
is called the positive operator associated with the outcome q. A more detailed description of the general
measurement formalism can be found in [23].
This formalism can be applied to our system Hsys = HC ⊗HS . However, we need to describe c as
classically encoded variable. This is done by adding the following restrictions to the above formalism:
• Any state inHC⊗HS should be described as a mixture of states in the canonical or the computational
basis of HC , i.e. its density matrix must be of the form:
ρsys =
∑
c
Pc(c)
∣∣ c〉〈c ∣∣⊗ ∣∣Φc〉〈Φc ∣∣ (82)
where computational basis means that no other basis than the canonical one {∣∣~a,~g,R, F,K〉}c
should be used (i.e. we shall not use basis containing cat-state vectors such as
∣∣ c1〉+∣∣ c2〉√
2
). The
probability Pc(c) is the probability of occurrence of c.
• Any positive operator describing a general measurement on HC ⊗HS should be of the form:
ΠC ⊗ EQ (83)
where ΠC (acting on HC) is some projection operator on the computational basis of HC (i.e. on
the subspace spanned by some set of vectors of the canonical basis). In other words,
ΠC =
∑
c∈A
∣∣ c〉〈c ∣∣ (84)
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for some set A of values c may take. The set A corresponds to the set of values c that are compatible
with the outcome associated with the positive operator.
The operator EQ (acting on HS) is some positive operator in HS . This model allows global
measurement in which two-way classical communication between Alice and Eve-Bob occurs. This
is necessary since variables such as E, and P(T , d) depend on Bob’s announcements.
In our model, Eve-Bob execute two measurements on the system. The first one, allowing to find D,
~h(D) given M but before public announcement occurs, the second one, allowing Eve-Bob to refine their
information once P is known.
However, technically, it is more convenient to think that Eve-Bob execute one single POVM mea-
surement on the whole product space HC ⊗HS . This POVM should obey certain constraints reflecting
the fact that D and ~h(D) should be measured before the public announcements by Alice and the box.
Let’s now describe more precisely the density matrix of the system and the POVM associated with
various possible measurements during the protocol.
Once Eve-Bob have learned the value taken by M, the density matrix of the system as seen by
Eve-Bob reads, prior to any further measurement,
ρ|M=M =
∑
c∈CM
Pc |M=M(c)
∣∣ c〉〈c ∣∣⊗ ∣∣Ψ(~g(S),~a(S))〉〈Ψ(~g(S),~a(S)) ∣∣ (85)
where
CM
Def
= {c′ = (~a′, ~g′, R′, F ′,K ′) : ~a′(M) = ~a(M), ~g′(M) = ~g(M)} , (86)∣∣Ψ(~g(S),~a(S))〉 Def= ⊗i∈S∣∣Ψ(gi, ai)〉. (87)
(in the definition of CM, ~a(M) and ~g(M) are given byM). The subscript “|M =M” stands for “given
M =M”. The probability distribution of Pc |M=M is normalised for each possible value for the size of
E, that is, for each possible value for the number of columns in the matrices F and K (recall that the
size of the parity check matrix and the privacy amplification matrix is given by the set E). This is to
ensure that the sum of probabilities of all outcomes c = (~a,~g,R, F,K) that are compatible with |E| = n
is equal to unity, for any possible value n. In other words,
∑
F and Khave n columns Pc |M=M(c) = 1.
Eve-Bob learn the outcome of M which is part of the view v. The remaining part of the view is
provided by a single generalised measurement defined by the POVM{(
v, Ev|M=M
)}
v∈ZM (88)
where ZM is the set of views givingM for the announcement regarding the multiple photon signals. We
have seen that for any v ∈ ZM, Ev|M=M reads
Ev|M=M = ΠCv|M=M ⊗ EQv|M=M (89)
where ΠCv|M=M is the projection onto the span of states
∣∣ c〉 ∈ HC for all c compatible with the view v.
Now ~a, R, F and K are given explicitly by v (of course, the number of columns in F and K is |E|
where E is given by v). The view v tells as well that ~g(M) = ~g(M) (secret announcement of Alice’s
source), ~g(E) = ~g(E) (announcement of ~g(E)) and F~g(E) = F~g(E) = ~s (announcement of ~s, and note
that F and E are given by v). Therefore, the set of all values for c compatible with v is{
(~a, ~y,R, F,K) : ~y ∈ C~s,~g(E∪M)
}
where
C~s,~g(E∪M) =
{
~x ∈ {0, 1}N : ~x(E ∪M) = ~g(E ∪M) and F~x(E) = ~s (mod 2)} (90)
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that is,
ΠCv|M=M =
∑
~x∈C~s,~g(E∪M)
∣∣~a, ~x,R, F,K〉〈~a, ~x,R, F,K ∣∣. (91)
Suppose now that at the end of the protocol, and after Eve-Bob get the view v, Alice announces
the key ~κ. Then the POVM associated to this situation reads
E(v,~κ)|M=M = ΠC(v,~κ)|M=M ⊗ EQv|M=M (92)
where EQv|M=M remains the same, since the additional data come from Alice’s announcement only, after
the attack. The set of all values for c compatible with (v, ~κ) in this situation is{
(~a, ~y,R, F,K) : ~y ∈ C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)
}
where
C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M) =
{
~x ∈ {0, 1}N : ~x(E ∪M) = ~g(E ∪M)
and F~x(E) = ~s (mod 2) and K~x(E) = ~κ (mod 2)
}
(93)
Therefore,
ΠC(v,~κ)|M=M =
∑
~x∈C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)
∣∣~a, ~x,R, F,K〉〈~a, ~x,R, F,K ∣∣. (94)
Of course, Alice will not announce publicly ~κ during the protocol. The above POVM has just been
derived so that we can compute Pv~κ(v, ~κ), the probability that Eve-Bob get the view v and that the key
takes the value ~κ.
Finally, we can assume that for any v, the positive operators EQv|M=M are of the rank one, i.e.
EQv|M=M =
∣∣φv〉〈φv ∣∣ (95)
where
∣∣φv〉 are some vectors in HS . The vectors ∣∣φv〉 are in general neither normalised nor orthogonal.
The reasons for this assumption follows: suppose a positive operator EQv0|M=M has a rank greater than
one, namely:
Ev0|M=M =
∑
i∈I
∣∣ ηi〉〈ηi ∣∣ (96)
where the vectors
∣∣ ηi〉 ∈ HS are possibly not normalised (such decomposition is always possible since
Ev0|M=M is Hermitian positive). I is a set of size greater than 1. Then the modified POVM
{(v, Ev|M=M)}v 6=v0 ∪ {((v0, i),ΠCv0|M=M ⊗
∣∣ ηi〉〈ηi ∣∣)}i∈I (97)
gives more precise information than the original POVM. This justifies our assumption.
Finally, we examine the constraint on the POVM {(v, Ev|M=M)}v∈ZM related to the fact that
givenM, Eve-Bob must determine D and ~h(D∩M) (~g(M) is already known and Eve-Bob do not commit
error on M) prior to Alice’s public announcements. We have seen that Eve-Bob may choose the set D
at their convenience. Since signals in M give perfect information about Alice’s bits and signals in V give
no information at all, we assume that Eve-Bob follow the optimal strategy by choosing D such that:
M ⊂ D and D ∩ V = ∅ (98)
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Now, since M, D and ~h(D ∩M) are parts of the view v, we can define the POVM{(
(M,D,~h(D ∩M)), ED,~h(D∩M)|M=M
)}
D :M⊂D,D∩V=∅
with
ED,~h(D∩M)|M=M =
∑
v gives D,~h(D∩M)
Ev|M=M (99)
which is the positive operator associated with the outcome (D,~h(D ∩M )) = (D,~h(D ∩M)) given that
M =M. When Eve-Bob make a measurement to determine D and ~h(D ∩M), the only data they have
about c are ~a(M) and ~g(M). Therefore,
ED,~h(D∩M)|M=M = Π
C
M ⊗ EQD,~h(D∩M)|M=M (100)
where EQD,~h(D∩M)|M=M is some positive operator acting on HS and
ΠCM =
∑
c∈CM
∣∣ c〉〈c ∣∣. (101)
To recapitulate, for any positive real number e > 0, the test P(A, e) on a subset A of D is modeled
as follows:
• Eve-Bob get an outcome M =M for the multiple photon signals, thanks to Alice’s source.
• Given M =M Eve-Bob determine the value taken by D and ~h(D ∩M) thanks to the POVM{(
(M,D,~h(D ∩M)), ED,~h(D∩M)|M=M = ΠCM ⊗ EQD,~h(D∩M)|M=M
)}
D :M⊂D,D∩V=∅
(102)
• Eve-Bob do not commit any error on A ∩M .
5.6 Bound on the conditional entropy of the key in the modified situation
In this section, we derive the bound on the conditional entropy of the key in the modified situation.
Throughout this section, we consider a given eavesdropping strategy chosen by Eve-Bob that fits the
model we gave previously.
The structure of the proof follows. We define the subset P of views in which Eve-Bob succeed to pass
the validation test (recall that in our protocol, the outcome of the validation test is publicly announced).
We define two subsets L and R of P . The subset L is the set of views for which the associated positive
operators obey a certain constraint. This constraint is related to the fact that it is very unlikely that
Eve-Bob pass the validation test while they have a substantial knowledge about Alice’s sifted key: indeed,
if a quantum signal is in the revealed set R, Eve-Bob want to learn the outcome of the measurement in the
basis indicated by the randomising box. If it is not in R, then Eve-Bob want to learn the measurement’s
outcome in the conjugate basis (since b˜i = ¬bi if i /∈ R). The trouble for Eve-Bob is that they do not
know R before they have to announce their bits ~h(D) and this can be translated in the form of the above
constraint. The second subset R corresponds to the set of views in which probabilistic properties we have
seen previously actually hold. We prove useful identities on R that are necessary in the subsequent part
of the proof. We then prove that: 1) when the view is in the intersection of R and L, Alice’s private
key is almost uniformly distributed and independent of Eve-Bob’s view, and 2) this intersection covers
almost completely the set P of views passing the test. Then conclusive calculations lead to the privacy
of the protocol.
The following lemma will be useful in this section.
25
Lemma 2 Let the density matrix of the system be of the form:
ρsys =
∑
c
Pc(c)
∣∣ c〉〈c ∣∣⊗ ∣∣Φc〉〈Φc ∣∣ (103)
where {∣∣Φc〉}c is an orthonormal set of vectors in HS , and let a positive operator acting on Hsys be of
the form:
F =
(∑
c∈A
∣∣ c〉〈c ∣∣)⊗ FQ (104)
where A is some set of values for c. Then for any operators V and W acting on HS ,
Tr (FV ρsysW ) = Pc(A)Tr
(
FQV ρsys,AW
)
(105)
provided Pc(A) > 0, where
Pc(A) =
∑
c′∈A
Pc(c
′) and (106)
ρsys,A =
1
Pc(A)
∑
c∈A
Pc(c)
∣∣Φc〉〈Φc ∣∣. (107)
Proof We have:
Tr(FV ρsysW ) =
∑
c∈A
∑
c′
Pc(c
′) |〈c|c′〉|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
δc,c′
Tr(FQV
∣∣Φc′〉〈Φc′ ∣∣W ) (108)
where δX,X′ =
{
0 if X 6= X ′
1 if X = X ′
=
∑
c∈A
Pc(c)Tr(F
QV
∣∣Φc〉〈Φc ∣∣W ) (109)
= Tr
(
FQV
∑
c∈A
Pc(c)
∣∣Φc〉〈Φc ∣∣W ). (110)
Now if Pc(A) =
∑
c′∈A Pc(c
′) > 0, then
Tr(FV ρsysW ) = Pc(A)Tr
(
FQV
1
Pc(A)
∑
c∈A
Pc(c)
∣∣Φc〉〈Φc ∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ρsys,A
W
)
. (111)
The factor Pc(A) has been only introduced so that ρsys,A is normalised:
Tr(ρsys,A) =
1
Pc(A)
∑
c∈A
Pc(c)Tr(
∣∣Φc〉〈Φc ∣∣)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1∀c
= 1. (112)
This concludes the proof. ✷
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5.6.1 Small sphere property
In this section we define L, the set of views passing the test and for which the associated positive operators
obey a certain constraint. We then prove that L covers almost completely P .
Definition 2 The set P is defined as the set of all views of Eve in which the validation test is passed.
P := {v ∈ Z : valid = true} . (113)
Definition 3 For any view
v = (M,D,~h(D), R, P, j) ∈ Z (114)
where M = (Σ, ~n(M),~a(M), ~g(M)) and P = (~a,~g(E), F,K,~s), define the partial view z as
z = (M,D,~h(D ∩M),~a,R) part of v. (115)
The partial view describes the data Eve-Bob have after receivingM and after measurement of D and
~h(D ∩M), followed by announcements of (~a,R) by Alice and the randomising box. Recall that Eve-Bob
do not make any mistake on M thanks to Alice’s source, and that they need only to get ~h(D ∩M) using
the POVM (102). Given any partial view z = (M,D,~h(D ∩M),~a,R), define Π0(z) as the orthogonal
projection operator onto Span({
∣∣∣Ψ(~j,~˜b)〉 |dE∩M (~j,~h) ≥ d2}) where d2 = (δ+ τf)1−pR2 n and where E, M
and ~h(D∩M) are given by the partial view z. We have restricted to E ∩M and T ∩M because Eve-Bob
do not commit any error on M . We prove now the following property (referred to as the small sphere
property in [2]).
Property 6 Let the subset of views L ⊂ P be defined by:
L Def=
{
v ∈ P :
PM(M)Tr
[
Ev|M=MΠ0(z)ρ|M=MΠ0(z)
] ≤√g(δ, τf , pR, n)Pv(v)}, (116)
where
g(δ, τf , pR, n) = exp
[
− 1
2δ + τf
τ2f
p2R
4
rminN + 2
(
τf
2δ + τf
)2]
. (117)
Then the probability weight of L is lower bounded by:
Pv(L) ≥ Pv(P)−
√
g(δ, τf , pR, n). (118)
Proof Define Zrmin ⊂ Z as the subset of views for which the size of D satisfies the first condition
of the validation test, i.e. n > rminN or Zrmin = {v ∈ Z : |D| > rminN where D is given by v.}.
Likewise, define Wrmin as the subset of partial views z for which the size of D satisfies the condition
n > rminN , that is Wrmin = {z : |D| > rminN}. We can assume that Pv(Zrmin) and Pz(Wrmin)
are strictly positive. Otherwise, since P is in Zrmin , this would imply Pv(P) = 0 which implies trivial
security of the protocol. Define the positive operator Π1(z) as the orthogonal projection operator onto
Span({
∣∣∣Ψ(~j,~˜b)〉 |dT∩M (~j,~h) ≥ d1}) where d1 = δ pR2 n, and where T , M and ~h(D ∩M) are given by z as
before. We also define Π1(z) as Π1(z) = 1−Π1(z).
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We first prove that the set of views Q defined by:
Q Def=
{
v ∈ Zrmin :
PM(M)Tr
[
Ev|M=MΠ1(z)Π0(z)ρ|M=MΠ0(z)Π1(z)
] ≤√g(δ, τf , pR, n)Pv(v)}. (119)
has probability bounded from below by:
Pv(Q) ≥ (1−
√
g(δ, τf , pR, n))Pv(Zrmin) (120)
Let’s assume that we are given that D = D for some set D. The starting point is the following:
as mentioned already, Eve-Bob do not know Alice’s bases ~a nor the choice of R during the quantum
transmission. This means that in a fictional situation F in which the single photons sent by Alice
are in the state
∣∣∣Ψ(~g(S),~˜b(S))〉 instead of |Ψ(~g(S),~a(S))〉 (the classically stored ~a remains however
unchanged), Property 1 holds for the subsets T and E of D. Let C be the random variable giving the set
of discrepancies between Alice’s bits ~g(D) and Bob’s bits ~h(D) on D. Then in such a situation, the error
set C is independent of Ω and R. This implies that T and E are independent of C. Using Property 1
for S = D, A = T , B = E and C with pA = pT = pR/2, pB = pE = (1 − pR)/2 (the factor 1/2 is the
probability that ai = b˜i (for T ) and ai 6= b˜i (for E) respectively), we have
Pr
(
P(T , d1) ∧ ¬P(E, d2
)|F , D = D)
≤ f(δ, τf , pR
2
,
1− pR
2
, n). (121)
Multiplying the above relation by PD(D) and summing for all D that satisfy |D| > rminN , one gets:
Pr
(
(n > rminN) ∧P(T , d1) ∧ ¬P(E, d2
)|F) ≤ g(δ, τf , pR, n)Pv(Zrmin) (122)
remarking that f(δ, τf ,
pR
2 ,
1−pR
2 , rminN) = g(δ, τf , pR, n) and that Pv(Zrmin) =
∑
D : |D|>rminN PD(D).
But the lhs. above reads:
Pr
(
(n > rminN) ∧P(T , d1) ∧ ¬P(E, d2)|F
)
=
∑
c
∑
z′∈Wrmin
Pc(c)PM | c=c(M′)Pz | F ,c=c,M=M′(z′) Pr(P(T , d1) ∧ ¬P(E, d2)|F , c = c, z = z′)(123)
where M′ is given uniquely by the partial view z′ = (M′,D′,~h′(D′ ∩M ′). Note that c and M are
independent of the event F .
It is easy to see from (102) that, given M = M, the POVM associated with the partial view
z ∈ WM (where WM is the set of partial views that are compatible with M =M) is:{
z = (M,D,~h(D ∩M),~a,R), Ez|M=M = ΠCM,~a,R ⊗ EQD,~h(D∩M)|M=M
}
z∈WM
(124)
where
ΠCM,~a,R =
∑
F ′,K′,~g′ :~g′(M)=~g(M)
∣∣~a,~g′, R, F ′,K ′〉〈~a,~g′, R, F ′,K ′ ∣∣ (125)
is the projection onto states giving ~a, ~g(M) and R for Alice’s choice of bases, Alice’s bits on M and the
randomising box’s choice for the revealed set, respectively.
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Using this POVM, we have:
Pz | F ,c=c,M=M′(z′) = Tr
[
Ez′|M=M′
∣∣ c〉〈c ∣∣⊗ ∣∣Ψ(~g(S′),~˜b(S′))〉〈Ψ(~g(S′),~˜b(S′)) ∣∣] (126)
= Tr
[
ΠCM′,~a′,R′ ⊗ EQD′,~h′(D′∩M ′)|M=M′
∣∣ c〉〈c ∣∣⊗
⊗ ∣∣Ψ(~g(S′),~˜b(S′))〉〈Ψ(~g(S′),~˜b(S′)) ∣∣] (127)
= δ~a,~a′δR,R′δ~g(M ′),~g′(M ′) ×
× Tr[EQD′,~h′(D′∩M ′)|M=M′ ∣∣Ψ(~g(S′),~˜b(S′))〉〈Ψ(~g(S′),~˜b(S′)) ∣∣] (128)
where S′, M ′ and ~g′(M ′) are given byM′, ~a′, R′, D′ and ~h′(D′ ∩M ′) are given by z′ and ~a, R and ~g are
given by c. We recall that M′ is part of z′.
Since Eve-Bob do not commit any error on M ,
Pr(P(T , d1) ∧ ¬P(E, d2)|F , c = c, z = z′)
= Pr(P(T ∩M , d1) ∧ ¬P(E ∩M , d2)|F , c = c, z = z′) (129)
= Pr(dT ′∩M ′(~g,~h
′) < d1 and dE′∩M ′(~g,~h
′) ≥ d2) (130)
= Tr
(
Π1(z
′)Π0(z′)
∣∣Ψ(~g(S′),~˜b(S′))〉〈Ψ(~g(S′),~˜b(S′)) ∣∣Π0(z′)Π1(z′)) . (131)
where the sets T ′, E′ and M ′ are uniquely given by the partial view z′.
Note that
Π1(z
′)Π0(z′)
∣∣Ψ(~g(S′),~˜b(S′))〉〈Ψ(~g(S′),~˜b(S′)) ∣∣Π0(z′)Π1(z′)
=

∣∣Ψ(~˜b(S′), ~g(S′))〉〈Ψ(~˜b(S′), ~g(S′)) ∣∣ if dT ′∩M ′(~g,~h′) < d1
and dE′∩M ′(~g,~h
′) ≥ d2
0 otherwise.
(132)
Therefore, the above term can be integrated in the other trace so that:
Pr
(
(n > rminN) ∧P(T , d1) ∧ ¬P(E, d2)|F)
=
∑
c
∑
z′∈Wrmin
PcM(c,M′)δ~a,~a′δR,R′δ~g(M ′),~g′(M ′) ×
× Tr[EQD′,~h′(D′∩M ′)|M=M′Π1(z′)Π0(z′)∣∣Ψ(~g(S′),~˜b(S′))〉〈Ψ(~g(S′),~˜b(S′)) ∣∣Π0(z′)Π1(z′)] (133)
but
PcM(c,M′) = PM(M′)Pc |M=M′(c) (134)
= PM(M′)P~g(S′)(~g(S′))P~a~g(S′)RFK|M=M′(~a,~g(S′), R, F,K) (135)
=
1
2|S′|
PM(M′)P~a~g(S′)RFK|M=M′(~a,~g(S′), R, F,K) (136)
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since ~g(S′) is uniformly distributed and independent of M , ~a, ~g(S′), R, F and K. Recall that Σ is not
chosen by Eve-Bob, but randomly by the source. Therefore,
Pr
(
(n > rminN) ∧P(T , d1) ∧ ¬P(E, d2)|F
)
=
∑
z′∈Wrmin
∑
~a,~g(S′),R,F,K
PM(M′)P~a~g(S′)RFK|M=M′(~a,~g(S′), R, F,K)δ~a,~a′δR,R′δ~g(M ′),~g′(M ′) ×
× Tr[EQD′,~h′(D′∩M ′)|M=M′Π1(z′)Π0(z′) ∑
~g(S′)
1
2|S′|
∣∣Ψ(~g(S′),~˜b(S′))〉〈Ψ(~g(S′),~˜b(S′)) ∣∣Π0(z′)Π1(z′)].(137)
The important point to remark is that∑
~g(S′)
1
2|S′|
∣∣Ψ(~g(S′),~˜b(S′))〉〈Ψ(~g(S′),~˜b(S′)) ∣∣ = 1S′
2|S′|
=
∑
~g(S′)
1
2|S′|
∣∣Ψ(~g(S′),~a(S′))〉〈Ψ(~g(S′),~a(S′)) ∣∣.
(138)
Therefore, setting back the sum over ~g(S′) and writing back the trace over classical spaces in the
original form, we obtain:
Pr
(
(n > rminN) ∧P(T , d1) ∧ ¬P(E, d2)|F
)
=
∑
c
∑
z′∈Wrmin
PcM(c,M′)δ~a,~a′δR,R′δ~g(M ′),~g′(M ′) ×
× Tr[EQD′,~h′(D′∩M ′)|M=M′Π1(z′)Π0(z′)∣∣Ψ(~g(S′),~a(S′))〉〈Ψ(~g(S′),~a(S′)) ∣∣Π0(z′)Π1(z′)] (139)
=
∑
z′∈Wrmin
∑
c∈CM′
PcM(c,M′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=PM(M′)Pc |M=M′ (c)
Tr
[
Ez′|M=M′
∣∣ c〉〈c ∣∣⊗Π1(z′)Π0(z′)
∣∣Ψ(~a(S′), ~g(S′))〉〈Ψ(~a(S′), ~g(S′)) ∣∣Π0(z′)Π1(z′)] (140)
=
∑
z′∈Wrmin
PM(M′)Tr
[
Ez′|M=M′Π1(z′)Π0(z′)ρ|M=M′Π0(z′)Π1(z′)
]
, or, (141)
=
∑
z∈Wrmin
PM(M)Tr
[
Ez|M=MΠ1(z)Π0(z)ρ|M=MΠ0(z)Π1(z)
]
, (142)
where M is given by z.
But Ez|M=M =
∑
v gives z Ev|M=M and we get
Pr
(
(n > rminN) ∧P(T , d1) ∧ ¬P(E, d2)|F
)
=
∑
v∈Zrmin
PM(M)Tr
[
Ev|M=MΠ1(z)Π0(z)ρ|M=MΠ0(z)Π1(z)
]
(143)
where M and z are given by v, and recalling the Inequality (122), we get∑
v∈Zrmin
PM(M)Tr
[
Ev|M=MΠ1(z)Π0(z)ρ|M=MΠ0(z)Π1(z)
] ≤ g(δ, τf , pR, n)Pv(Zrmin). (144)
At this point we use the following lemma:
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Lemma 3 Let µ be a strictly positive real number. Let y be a random variable taking values in a set Y.
Let {ay}y∈Y be a set of |Y| real nonnegative numbers such that
∑
y∈Y ay ≤ µ. Let q be a strictly positive
number. If we define the subset X ⊂ Y by
X = {y ∈ Y : ay ≤ µqPy(y)} (145)
Then Py(X ) ≥ 1− 1q .
Proof Assume to the contrary that the set S = Y \ X = {y ∈ Y : ay > µqPy(y)} has probability
Py(S) greater than
1
q . Then∑
y
ay ≥
∑
y∈S
ay > µq
∑
y∈S
Py(y) = µqPy(S) ≥ µ (146)
Therefore
∑
y ay > µ which is a contradiction. This concludes the proof. ✷
Define the set of views Q as:
Q Def=
{
v ∈ Zrmin :
PM(M)Tr
[
Ev|M=MΠ1(z)Π0(z)ρ|M=MΠ0(z)Π1(z)
] ≤√g(δ, τf , pR, n)Pv(v)}. (147)
Then applying the above lemma for µ = g(δ, τf , pR, n)Pv(Zrmin), q = 1/
√
g(δ, τf , pR, n) and the proba-
bility distribution on Zrmin given by the conditional distribution Pv(v)/Pv(Zrmin), we find that
Pv(Q) ≥ (1 −
√
g(δ, τf , pR, n))Pv(Zrmin). (148)
Thus, for any view v ∈ Q ∩ P , we have:
PM(M)Tr
[
Ev|M=MΠ1(z)Π0(z)ρ|M=MΠ0(z)Π1(z)
] ≤√g(δ, τf , pR, n)Pv(v). (149)
However, since v ∈ P we also have:
PM(M)Tr(Ev|M=MΠ1(z)Π0(z)ρ|M=MΠ0(z)Π1(z)) (150)
= PM~aRFK(M,~a,R, F,K)P~g(C~s,~g(E∪M))Tr
[
EQv|M=MΠ1(z)Π0(z)
1
|C~s,~g(E∪M)|
∑
~x∈C~s,~g(E∪M)
∣∣Ψ(~x,~a)〉〈Ψ(~x,~a) ∣∣Π0(z)Π1(z)] (151)
using Lemma 2, and since for any ~x ∈ C~s,~g(E∪M) (note that ai = b˜i for i ∈ T ),
Π1(z)
∣∣Ψ(~x,~a)〉〈Ψ(~x,~a) ∣∣Π1(z) = ∣∣Ψ(~x,~a)〉〈Ψ(~x,~a) ∣∣ (152)
(that is, z = (M,D,~h(D ∩M),~a,R) verifies dT∩M (~h, ~x) < d1 for any ~x ∈ C~s,~g(E∪M)). Note that Π0(z)
and Π1(z) commute. Thus we have:
∀v ∈ Q ∩ P
PM(M)Tr(Ev|M=MΠ1(z)Π0(z)ρ|M=MΠ0(z)Π1(z))
= PM(M)Tr(Ev|M=MΠ0(z)ρ|M=MΠ0(z)) (153)
≤ Pv(v)
√
g(δ, τf , pR, n) (154)
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since Π0(z) acts only on HE∩M . This proves that Q∩P ⊂ L. Therefore the probability of L is bounded
from below by:
Pv(L) ≥ Pv(Q∩ P) (155)
≥ Pv(P)− Pv(Q ∩ Zrmin) (156)
≥ Pv(P)−
√
g(δ, τf , pR, n), (157)
which concludes the proof of the small sphere property. ✷
5.6.2 Identities on R
Here we define another big subset of P , corresponding to the set of views in which probabilistic assump-
tions such as l̂ ≥ l̂min, d̂w ≥ 2(δ + τf )1−pR2 n holds. We require as well that for any v ∈ R, Pv(v) > 0.
Formally,
R = {v ∈ P : v verifies
l̂ ≥ l̂min,
d̂w ≥ 2(δ + τf )1− pR
2
n,
Pv(v) > 0} (158)
remembering that l̂, l̂min and d̂w are all uniquely defined by Eve-Bob’s view v.
In the last section of this proof, a bound on the probability of the set of views R∩P will be needed.
We have, using Properties 3 and 4,
Pv(R ∩P) ≤ Pr(l̂ ≤ l̂min ∧ n > rminN) +
+ Pr
( d̂w
2
< (δ + τf )
1 − pR
2
n ∧ l̂ ≥ l̂min ∧ n > rminN
)
(159)
≤ e−2τ2MN + e−2τˆ2(rminN−Mmax + 2−τp( 1−pR2 −τˆ)(rminN−Mmax (160)
We now prove the following properties on R, i.e. for
v = (M,D,~h(D), R, P, j) ∈ R (161)
where M = (Σ, ~n(M),~a(M), ~g(M)), Σ = (V, S,M) and P = (~a,~g(E), F,K,~s). This implies for instance
that d̂w verifies d̂w ≥ 2(δ + τf )1−pR2 n in this section. It might be useful to realise that the following
properties are exactly equivalent to the properties proved in the original paper [2] in which the sifted
keys ~g(E) and ~h(E) are replaced by the single-photon encoded sifted keys ~g(E ∩M) and ~h(E ∩M).
Property 7
∀v ∈ R, ∀~κ ∈ {0, 1}m, |C~s,~g(E∪M)| = 2m|C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)| (162)
Proof We remark that:
C~s,~g(E∪M) = {~x ∈ {0, 1}N : ~x(E ∪M) = ~g(E ∪M) and
F̂ ~x(E ∩M) = ~s+ Fˇ~g(E ∩M) (mod 2)} (163)
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(+ and − are equivalent in arithmetics modulo 2), and
C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M) = {~x ∈ {0, 1}N : ~x(E ∪M) = ~g(E ∪M) and
F̂ ~x(E ∩M) = ~s+ Fˇ~g(E ∩M) (mod 2),
K̂~x(E ∩M) = ~κ+ Kˇ~g(E ∩M) (mod 2)}. (164)
Now, for v ∈ R, d̂w > 0, that is, rows of K̂ are linearly independent and each row of K̂ is linearly
independent of rows of F̂ . Therefore K̂~x(E ∩M) = ~κ + Kˇ~g(E ∩M) (mod 2) introduces m additional
linearly independent constraints in C~s,~g(E∪M). Thus |C~s,~g(E∪M)| = 2m|C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)|. ✷
Property 8 For any ~κ ∈ {0, 1}m and v ∈ R, the mutual probability of the outcome (v, ~κ) reads:
Pv~κ(v, ~κ) =
1
2m
PMPR(M, P,R)
〈
φ˜v
∣∣ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣ φ˜v〉 (165)
where
• PMPR(M, P,R) =
∑
~x∈C~s,~g(E∪M) PM(M)P~a~gRFK |M=M(~a, ~x,R, F,K) is the probability that Al-
ice announces P = (~a,~g(E), F,K,~s), the box announces R and Eve-Bob get M thanks to the photon
number splitting attack.
• |Ψ(~g(A),~a(A))〉 = ⊗i∈A |Ψ(gi, ai)〉 ∈ HA for any set A ⊂ S, where HA stands for the Hilbert space
describing the photons in A.
• ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M) = 1|C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)|
∑
~x∈C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)
∣∣Ψ(~x(E ∩M),~a(E ∩M))〉〈Ψ(~x(E ∩M),~a(E ∩M)) ∣∣
• ∣∣ φ˜v〉 = 〈Ψ(~g(E ∪M),~a(E ∪M))∣∣φv〉 ∈ HE∩M .
Note that in the above notation, M, P , R, C~s,~g(E∪M) and C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M) are all given by v.
Property 9 For any view v ∈ R and for any operators V and W acting on the restricted space HE∩M ⊂
HS,
PM(M)Tr(Ev|M=MV ρ|M=MW ) = PMPR(M, P,R)
〈
φ˜v
∣∣V ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)W ∣∣ φ˜v〉 (166)
where
• ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M) = 1|C~s,~g(E∪M)|
∑
~x∈C~s,~g(E∪M)
∣∣Ψ(~x(E ∩M),~a(E ∩M))〉〈Ψ(~x(E ∩M),~a(E ∩M)) ∣∣
• and other elements defined as previously.
Proof Using Lemma 2 for ρ|M=M, E(v,~κ)|M=M and Ev|M=M, we get (recall that M is given by
v)
Pv~κ(v, ~κ) = PM(M)Pv~κ |M=M(v, ~κ) (167)
= PM(M)Tr(E(v,~κ)|M=Mρ|M=M) (168)
= PM(M)P~aRFK |M=M(~a,R, F,K)P~g(C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M))Tr(EQv|M=Mρ~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)) (169)
where
ρ~s,~κ,~g(E∪M) =
1
P~g(C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M))
∑
~x∈C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)
P~g(~x)
∣∣Ψ(~x,~a)〉〈Ψ(~x,~a) ∣∣ (170)
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and
PM(M)Tr(Ev|M=MV ρ|M=MW ) = PM(M)P~aRFK |M=M(~a,R, F,K)P~g(C~s,~g(E∪M))Tr(EQv|M=MV ρ~s,~g(E∪M)W )
(171)
where
ρ~s,~g(E∪M) =
1
P~g(C~s,~g(E∪M))
∑
~x∈C~s,~g(E∪M)
P~g(~x)
∣∣Ψ(~x,~a)〉〈Ψ(~x,~a) ∣∣. (172)
Now V andW act only on HE∩M and for any ~x ∈ C~s,~g(E∪M) or C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M), ~x(E∪M) = ~g(E∪M).
Thus 〈
Ψ(~x,~a)
∣∣X∣∣φv〉 = 〈Ψ(~x(E ∩M),~a(E ∩M)) ∣∣X∣∣ φ˜v〉 (173)
where X is V orW . Noting that P~g is uniform, for any ~x, we have P~g(~x)/P~g(C~s,~g(E∪M)) = 1/|C~s,~g(E∪M)|
and P~g(~x)/P~g(C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)) = 1/|C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)|. Finally we use the identities P~g(C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)) = 12mP~g(C~s,~g(E∪M))
and PM(M)P~aRFK |M=M(~a,R, F,K)P~g(C~s,~g(E∪M)) = PMPR(M, P,R). This concludes the proof. ✷
It follows that the marginal probability of v ∈ R reads:
Pv(v) = PM(M)Tr(Ev|M=Mρ|M=M) = PMPR(M, P,R)
〈
φ˜v
∣∣ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)∣∣ φ˜v〉. (174)
Finally, for any ket
∣∣χ〉 ∈ HE∩M , for any ~κ ∈ {0, 1}m, we denote by rv,~κ(∣∣χ〉) the ratio:
rv,~κ(
∣∣χ〉) = 〈χ ∣∣ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣χ〉〈
χ
∣∣ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)∣∣χ〉 (175)
whenever
〈
χ
∣∣ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)∣∣χ〉 > 0 and rv,~κ(∣∣χ〉) = 1 otherwise.
It is easy to see that, for any view v ∈ R, any key ~κ and any ket ∣∣χ〉 ∈ HE∩M such that〈
χ
∣∣ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)∣∣χ〉 > 0
∑
~κ∈{0,1}m
rv,~κ(
∣∣χ〉) = 〈χ ∣∣∑~κ∈{0,1}m ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣χ〉〈
χ
∣∣ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)∣∣χ〉 (176)
= 2m (177)
where we have used the identity
∑
k∈{0,1}m ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M) = 2
mρ˜~s,~g(E∪M) which follows directly from Prop-
erty 7. The identity
∑
~κ∈{0,1}m rv,~κ(
∣∣ ξ〉) = 2m holds for 〈χ ∣∣ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)∣∣χ〉 = 0 as well.
5.6.3 Quasi-independence of the key and the view on R∩ L
We are going to prove in this section that the probability of the joint event in which Eve-Bob get the
view v and Alice gets the key ~κ reads, provided v ∈ R ∩ L,
Pv~κ(v, ~κ) = πv + ηv,~κ (178)
where πv is independent of ~κ and an upper bound is found on |ηv,~κ|.
For any view v ∈ R and any key value ~κ ∈ {0, 1}m, we have seen that (Property 8),
Pv~κ(v, ~κ) =
1
2m
PMPR(M, P,R)
〈
φ˜v
∣∣ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣ φ˜v〉. (179)
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Let Πw(z) be the orthogonal projection onto the subspace Hw = Span
{ ∣∣∣Ψ(~j,~˜b)〉 ∣∣ dE∩M (~j,~h) ≥
d̂w
2
} ⊂ HS . The minimum weight d̂w has been defined in Section 5.3. As before, the partial view z is
specified by the view v. Let Πw(z) = 1−Πw(z). Then Πw(z) and Πw(z) act non trivially only on HE∩M ,
and 〈
φ˜v
∣∣ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣ φ˜v〉 = 〈φ˜v ∣∣(Πw(z) + Πw(z))ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)(Πw(z) + Πw(z))∣∣ φ˜v〉. (180)
Therefore,
Pv~κ(v, ~κ) =
1
2m
PMPR(M, P,R)
[〈
φ˜v
∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉+
+
〈
φ˜v
∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣ φ˜v〉+ 〈φ˜v ∣∣ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉−
− 〈φ˜v ∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉]. (181)
We show that the first term in the rhs. in Equation (181) corresponds to the term independent of
~κ and we derive a bound on the modulus of the remaining terms in the following parts.
The term independent of the key
Property 10 For any view v in R∩L, the first term in the rhs. of (181) is independent of ~κ. This term
will be denoted by πv subsequently, for any v ∈ R ∩ L. That is,
πv
Def
=
1
2m
PMPR(M, P,R)
〈
φ˜v
∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉. (182)
Proof We need the following identity:
Lemma 4
∀~α, ~β ∈ {0, 1}l̂, (183)〈
Ψ(~α,~˜b(E ∩M)) ∣∣ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M) ∣∣∣Ψ(~β,~˜b(E ∩M))〉 = 1
2l̂
×
{
0 if (~α+ ~β) /∈ Ĝ
(−1)(~α+~β)·~θ if (~α+ ~β) ∈ Ĝ. (184)
where ~θ is a vector in {0, 1}l̂ such that Ĝ~θ =
(
~s
~κ
)
+ Gˇ~g(E ∩M) (~θ exists since |C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)| > 0 for
v ∈ R). We recall that Ĝ has been defined in Section 5.3.
Proof of the lemma First we need some definitions. For y ∈ {0, 1} and for a ∈ {+,×}, define
the unitary operator Uay acting on a single photon Hilbert space:
∀x ∈ {0, 1}, Uay
∣∣Ψ(x, a)〉 = ∣∣Ψ(x+ y, a)〉 (185)
It is easy to verify that on the opposite basis Uay acts as:
Uay
∣∣Ψ(x,¬a)〉 = (−1)xy∣∣Ψ(x,¬a)〉. (186)
Likewise, for ~y ∈ {0, 1}l̂ define the unitary operator U~a(E∩M)y acting on HE∩M as:
∀~x ∈ {0, 1}l̂, U~a(E∩M)~y
∣∣Ψ(~x,~a(E ∩M))〉 = ∣∣Ψ(~x+ ~y,~a(E ∩M))〉. (187)
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It is easy to see that U
~a(E∩M)
~y is involutive, that is U
~a(E∩M)−1
~y = U
~a(E∩M)
~y . Since b˜i = ¬ai for
i ∈ E ∩M , we have, using equation (186),
∀~x, U~a(E∩M)~y
∣∣Ψ(~x,~˜b(E ∩M))〉 = (−1)~x·~y∣∣Ψ(~x,~˜b(E ∩M))〉. (188)
Returning to our proof, we express ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M) (defined in Property 9), recalling that Ĝ =
(
F̂
K̂
)
.
Furthermore, we use the fact that for any ~y ∈ {0, 1}l̂,
Ĝ~y =
(
~s
~κ
)
+ Gˇ~g(E ∩M)⇔ ~y ∈ ~θ + Ĉ (189)
where θ is a vector in {0, 1}l̂ such that Ĝ~θ =
(
~s
~κ
)
+ Gˇ~g(E ∩M) (such ~θ exists since C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M) 6= ∅).
This gives, recalling that Ĉ =
(
Ĝ
)⊥
,
ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M) =
1
|C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)|
∑
~x∈{0,1}N |
~x(E∪M)=~g(E∪M)
Ĝ~x(E∩M)=(~s~κ)+
+Gˇ~g(E∩M)
∣∣Ψ(~x(E ∩M),~a(E ∩M))〉〈Ψ(~x(E ∩M),~a(E ∩M)) ∣∣(190)
=
1
|C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)|
∑
~y∈~θ+Ĉ
∣∣Ψ(~y,~a(E ∩M))〉〈Ψ(~y,~a(E ∩M)) ∣∣ (191)
=
1
|C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)|
∑
~y∈Ĉ
∣∣Ψ(~y + ~θ,~a(E ∩M))〉〈Ψ(~y + ~θ,~a(E ∩M)) ∣∣, (192)
and, using Equation (188), for all ~α, ~β ∈ {0, 1}l̂,〈
Ψ(~α,~˜b(E ∩M)) ∣∣ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣Ψ(~β,~˜b(E ∩M))〉
=
〈
Ψ(~α,~˜b(E ∩M)) ∣∣ 1|C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)|
∑
~y∈Ĉ
U
~a(E∩M)
~θ
∣∣Ψ(~y,~a(E ∩M))〉×
×〈Ψ(~y,~a(E ∩M)) ∣∣U~a(E∩M)~θ ∣∣Ψ(~β,~˜b(E ∩M))〉 (193)
= (−1)(~α+~β)·~θ〈Ψ(~α,~˜b(E ∩M)) ∣∣ρ0∣∣Ψ(~β,~˜b(E ∩M))〉, (194)
where
ρ0 =
1
|C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)|
∑
~y∈Ĉ
∣∣Ψ(~y,~a(E ∩M))〉〈Ψ(~y,~a(E ∩M)) ∣∣ (195)
Let q = dim Ĉ, and {~θ1, . . . ~θq} be a basis of Ĉ. Let Ĉ(j) be the span of {~θ1, . . . ~θj} for j ∈ {1, . . . q}.
For j ∈ {1, . . . q}, define ρ(j) as:
ρ(j) =
1
2j
∑
~x∈Ĉ(j)
∣∣Ψ(~x,~a(E ∩M))〉〈Ψ(~x,~a(E ∩M)) ∣∣. (196)
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We show by induction on j ∈ {0, . . . q} that
∀~α, ~β ∈ {0, 1}l̂, 〈Ψ(~α,~˜b(E ∩M)) ∣∣ρ(j)∣∣Ψ(~β,~˜b(E ∩M))〉 = { 1/2l̂ if ~α+ ~β ∈ Ĉ(j)⊥
0 if ~α+ ~β /∈ Ĉ(j)⊥. . (197)
For j = 0, we have Ĉ(0) = {~0} and Ĉ(0)⊥ = {0, 1}l̂ and ρ(0) = ∣∣Ψ(~0,~a(E ∩M))〉〈Ψ(~0,~a(E ∩M)) ∣∣.
Thus
∀~α, ~β, 〈Ψ(~α,~˜b(E ∩M)) ∣∣ρ(0)∣∣Ψ(~β,~˜b(E ∩M))〉 = 1
2l̂
, (198)
and (197) holds (Recall ai = ¬b˜i on E ∩M).
Suppose (197) holds for some j ∈ {0, . . . q − 1}. Since Ĉ(j+1) = Ĉ(j) ∪ (~θj+1 + Ĉ(j)), we have
ρ(j+1) =
1
2
( 1
2j
∑
~x∈Ĉ(j)
∣∣Ψ(~x,~a(E ∩M))〉〈Ψ(~x,~a(E ∩M)) ∣∣+
+
1
2j
∑
~x∈~θj+1+Ĉ(j)
∣∣Ψ(~x,~a(E ∩M))〉〈Ψ(~x,~a(E ∩M)) ∣∣) (199)
=
1
2
(
ρ(j) + U
~a(E∩M)
~θj+1
ρ(j)U
~a(E∩M)
~θj+1
)
. (200)
Thus,
∀~α, ~β, 〈Ψ(~α,~˜b(E ∩M)) ∣∣ρ(j+1)∣∣Ψ(~β,~˜b(E ∩M))〉
=
1
2
〈
Ψ(~α,~˜b(E ∩M)) ∣∣ρ(j)∣∣Ψ(~β,~˜b(E ∩M))〉 (1 + (−1)(~α+~β)·~θj+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
 2 if ~α+ ~β ∈ ~θ
⊥
j+1
0 if ~α+ ~β /∈ ~θ⊥j+1.
. (201)
And since (197) holds for j, we get
〈
Ψ(~α,~˜b(E ∩M)) ∣∣ρ(j+1)∣∣Ψ(~β,~˜b(E ∩M))〉 = { 1/2l̂ if ~α+ ~β ∈ Ĉ(j+1)⊥,
0 if ~α+ ~β /∈ Ĉ(j+1)⊥. (202)
which concludes our induction. Noting that Ĉ(q) = Ĉ, |Ĉ| = |C~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)|, Ĉ⊥ = Ĝ, and ρ(q) = ρ0, for any
~α, ~β ∈ {0, 1}l̂,
〈
Ψ(~α,~˜b(E ∩M)) ∣∣ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣Ψ(~β,~˜b(E ∩M))〉 = 1
2l̂
×
{
0 if (~α + ~β) /∈ Ĝ
(−1)(~α+~β)·~θ if (~α+ ~β) ∈ Ĝ. (203)
which concludes the proof of the lemma. ✷
Now by definition of Ĝ, for any vector ~γ ∈ Ĝ, there exists a vector ~λ~γ ∈ {0, 1}r+m such that
~λT~γ Ĝ = γ (204)
and the above property reads:
〈
Ψ(~α,~˜b(E ∩M)) ∣∣ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣Ψ(~β,~˜b(E ∩M))〉 = 1
2l̂
×
{
0 if (~α + ~β) /∈ Ĝ
(−1)~λ(~α+~β)·((~s~κ)+Gˇ~g(E∩M)) if (~α+ ~β) ∈ Ĝ.
(205)
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To see that the first term in (181) is independent of ~κ, recalling the definition of Πw(z), write〈
φ˜v
∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉
=
∑
~α,~β∈{0,1}l̂|
w(~α−~h(E∩M))<d̂w/2
w(~β−~h(E∩M))<d̂w/2
〈φ˜v
∣∣Ψ(α,~˜b(E ∩M))〉〈Ψ(α,~˜b(E ∩M)) ∣∣ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣Ψ(β,~˜b(E ∩M))〉 ×
× 〈Ψ(β,~˜b(E ∩M)) ∣∣φ˜v〉 (206)
and the ~α’s and the ~β’s contributing to the above sum obey
w(~α + ~β) ≤ w(~α − ~h(E ∩M)) + w(~β − ~h(E ∩M)) < d̂w (207)
thus ~α + ~β /∈ Ĝ∗ (the set Ĝ∗ has been defined in Section 5.3). The ~α and ~β of the terms contributing
in the sum are such that their sum is in Ĝ (according to the previous lemma) but not in Ĝ∗. Since (by
definition of Ĝ∗) for ~α+ ~β ∈ Ĝ \ Ĝ∗, ~λ~α+~β is of the form
(
~z
~0
)
where ~z ∈ {0, 1}r, the terms
〈φ˜v
∣∣Ψ(α,~˜b(E ∩M)〉〈Ψ(α,~˜b(E ∩M) ∣∣ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣Ψ(β,~˜b(E ∩M))〉〈Ψ(β,~˜b(E ∩M)) ∣∣φ˜v〉
=
1
2l̂
(−1)~λ~α+~β ·((~s~κ)+Gˇ~g(E∩M))〈φ˜v
∣∣∣Ψ(~α,~˜b(E ∩M))〉 〈Ψ(~β,~˜b(E ∩M)) ∣∣φ˜v〉 (208)
contributing in the above sum (i.e. for ~α+~β ∈ Ĝ\Ĝ∗) does not depend on ~κ. Therefore 〈φ˜v ∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉
does not depend on ~κ. Now PMPR(M, P,R) is independent of ~κ since the m rows of K̂ are linearly inde-
pendent between themselves and linearly independent of the rows of F̂ (since d̂w > 0 on R by definition
(Eq. (158))).
Therefore, the term in the rhs. of (182) is independent of ~κ. This concludes the proof of the property.
✷
The deviation from the key-independent term
We now derive an upper bound on |P~κv(~κ, v)− πv|.
Property 11 For any v ∈ R∩ L and ~κ ∈ {0, 1}m, define ηv,~κ as
ηv,~κ
Def
= Pv~κ(v, ~κ)− πv. (209)
The modulus of ηv,~κ is then upper bounded for any v ∈ R ∩ L and any ~κ ∈ {0, 1}m by
|ηv,~κ| ≤ 1
2m
Pv(v)
(
rv,~κ(Πw(z)
∣∣ φ˜v〉) + rv,~κ(∣∣ φ˜v〉)) [2√√g(δ, τf , pR, n) +√g(δ, τf , pR, n)]. (210)
Proof For any v ∈ R ∩ L and ~κ ∈ {0, 1}m, we have from Equation (181),
ηv,~κ = Pv~κ(v, ~κ)− πv (211)
=
1
2m
PMPR(M, P,R)
[〈
φ˜v
∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣ φ˜v〉+ 〈φ˜v ∣∣ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉−
− 〈φ˜v ∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉] (212)
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Remarking that the second term in the bracket is only the complex conjugate of the first term, we
have
|ηv,~κ| ≤ 1
2m
PMPR(M, P,R)
[
2
∣∣∣〈φ˜v ∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣ φ˜v〉∣∣∣+
+
〈
φ˜v
∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉]. (213)
Now, the first term in the bracket verifies∣∣∣〈φ˜v ∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜1/2~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)ρ˜1/2~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣ φ˜v〉∣∣∣
≤
∥∥∥ρ˜1/2
~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)
∣∣ φ˜v〉∥∥∥× ∥∥∥ρ˜1/2~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣ φ˜v〉∥∥∥ (214)
using the Schwartz inequality and the fact ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M) is Hermitian non negative
=
√〈
φ˜v
∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉×√〈φ˜v ∣∣ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣ φ˜v〉. (215)
Now recalling the definition of rv,~κ, we have〈
φ˜v
∣∣ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)∣∣ φ˜v〉 = rv,~κ[∣∣ φ˜v〉]〈φ˜v ∣∣ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)∣∣ φ˜v〉 (216)
since
〈
φ˜v
∣∣ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)∣∣ φ˜v〉 > 0, for any v ∈ R (Recall that Pv(v) = PMPR(M, P,R)〈φ˜v ∣∣ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)∣∣ φ˜v〉).
And 〈
φ˜v
∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉 = rv,~κ[Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉]〈φ˜v ∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉 (217)
(recall that if
〈
φ˜v
∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉 = 0 then 〈φ˜v ∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~κ,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉 = 0 as well).
The latter can be bounded using the small sphere property (Property 6). If v ∈ R∩ L,
PM(M)Tr(Ev|M=MΠ0(z)ρ|M=MΠ0(z))
= PMPR(M, P,R)
〈
φ˜v
∣∣Π0(z)ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)Π0(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉 (218)
≤ Pv(v)
√
g(δ, τf , pR, n). (219)
Now for z ∈ R, d̂w2 > d2, thus ImΠw(z) ⊂ ImΠ0(z) (refer to the beginning of Section 5.6.1),
that is Πw(z) projects onto a space contained in the space on which Π0(z) projects. In other words,
Span{
∣∣∣Ψ(~j,~˜b)〉 |dE∩M (~j,~h) ≥ d̂w/2} ⊂ Span{∣∣∣Ψ(~j,~˜b)〉 |dE∩M (~j,~h) ≥ d2}
Since ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M) is Hermitian non negative, it implies that〈
φ˜v
∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉 ≤ 〈φ˜v ∣∣Π0(z)ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)Π0(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉 (220)
Therefore, using Property 6, we have, ∀~κ ∈ {0, 1}m, ∀v ∈ R ∩ L,
PMPR(M, P,R)
〈
φ˜v
∣∣Πw(z)ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)Πw(z)∣∣ φ˜v〉 ≤ Pv(v)√g(δ, τf , pR, n). (221)
Linking the results (213,215,216,217,221) together, we obtain
∀~κ ∈ {0, 1}m, ∀v ∈ R∩ L,
|ηv,~κ| ≤ 1
2m
PMPR(M, P,R)
[
2
√
Pv(v)
PMPR(M, P,R)
√
g(δ, τf , pR, n)rv,~κ
(
Πw(z)
∣∣ φ˜v〉)×
×
√
rv,~κ
(∣∣ φ˜v〉)〈φ˜v ∣∣ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)∣∣ φ˜v〉+
+
Pv(v)
PMPR(M, P,R)
√
g(δ, τf , pR, n)rv,~κ(Πw(z)
∣∣ φ˜v〉)] (222)
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and using
〈
φ˜v
∣∣ρ˜~s,~g(E∪M)∣∣ φ˜v〉 = Pv(v)/PMPR(M, P,R), we get
|ηv,~κ| ≤ 1
2m
[
2
√√
g(δ, τf , pR, n)×
√
rv,~κ
(
Πw(z)
∣∣ φ˜v〉)rv,~κ(∣∣ φ˜v〉)+
+
√
g(δ, τf , pR, n)rv,~κ
(
Πw(z)
∣∣ φ˜v〉)]Pv(v) (223)
≤ 1
2m
max
({
rv,~κ
(
Πw(z)
∣∣ φ˜v〉), rv,~κ(∣∣ φ˜v〉)})× [2√√g(δ, τf , pR, n) +√g(δ, τf , pR, n)]Pv(v)(224)
≤ 1
2m
[
rv,~κ
(
Πw(z)
∣∣ φ˜v〉)+ rv,~κ(∣∣ φ˜v〉)]× [2√√g(δ, τf , pR, n) +√g(δ, τf , pR, n)]Pv(v). (225)
This concludes our proof. ✷
5.6.4 Bound on the conditional entropy
In this section we conclude the privacy proof by deriving from the previous result the following property.
Property 12 The conditional Shannon entropy of the key ~κ given Eve’s view v is lower bounded by
H(~κ|v) ≥ m− ǫ1(N,m) (226)
where
ǫ1(N,m) = 2
(
m+
1
ln 2
)
h(δ, τf , pR, n) + 2
√
2
(
m+
1
ln 2
)
mh(δ, τf , pR, n) +m
(
Pv(R∩ P) + Pv(L ∩ P)
)
(227)
and
h(δ, τf , pR, n) = 2
√√
g(δ, τf , pR, n) +
√
g(δ, τf , pR, n) as defined previously. (228)
Proof We first prove that for any strictly positive real number q and for any view v ∈ R∩L, there
exists a set Kv ⊂ {0, 1}m such that
• |Kv| ≥ 2m(1− 1q ), and
• ∀~κ ∈ Kv, ∣∣∣∣P~κ |v=v(~κ)− 12m
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12m (2q + 2)h(δ, τf , pR, n). (229)
From that we prove the bound on the conditional entropy (Eqn.(226)).
For any view v ∈ R ∩ L, summing over ~κ ∈ {0, 1}m the joint probability P~κv(~κ, v) = πv + ηv,~κ, we
get, using Property 10
∀v ∈ R∩ L,
∑
~κ∈{0,1}m
P~κv(~κ, v) = Pv(v) = 2
mπv +
∑
~κ∈{0,1}m
ηv,~κ. (230)
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but ∣∣∣∣∣∑
~κ
ηv,~κ
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∑
~κ
|ηv,~κ| (231)
≤ 1
2m
Pv(v)h(δ, τf , pR, n)
(∑
~κ
rv,~κ
(
Πw(z)
∣∣ φ˜v〉)+∑
~κ
rv,~κ
(∣∣ φ˜v〉)) (232)
≤ 2Pv(v)h(δ, τf , pR, n) (233)
using Property 11 and the identity (177).
Therefore,
|Pv(v) − 2mπv| ≤ 2Pv(v)h(δ, τf , pR, n) (234)
that is
|P~κv(~κ, v)− 1
2m
Pv(v)|
≤ |P~κv(~κ, v)− πv|+ |πv − 1
2m
Pv(v)| (235)
≤ 1
2m
Pv(v)h(δ, τf , pR, n)
[
rv,~κ
(
Πw(z)
∣∣ φ˜v〉)+ rv,~κ (∣∣ φ˜v〉)+ 2] (236)
or
|P~κ |v=v(~κ)− 1
2m
| ≤ 1
2m
h(δ, τf , pR, n)
[
rv,~κ
(
Πw(z)
∣∣ φ˜v〉)+ rv,~κ (∣∣ φ˜v〉)+ 2]. (237)
Let av,~κ = rv,~κ(Πw(z)
∣∣ φ˜v〉) + rv,~κ(∣∣ φ˜v〉). Then using again identity (177), we have∑
~κ∈{0,1}m
av,~κ = 2
m+1. (238)
Let q be a strictly positive real number. Let U be a random variable taking value in {0, 1}m with
uniform probability distribution, i.e. ∀~κ ∈ {0, 1}m, PU (~κ) = 1/2m. Then using Lemma 3 for U with
µ = 2m+1, we find that
PU (Kv) ≥ 1− 1
q
(239)
where the set Kv is defined by:
Kv =
{
~κ ∈ {0, 1}m : av,~κ < 2m+1q 1
2m
= 2q
}
. (240)
In other words,
|Kv| ≥ 2m
(
1− 1
q
)
. (241)
Let I be the set defined by
I = ∪v∈R∩LKv × {v} ⊂ {0, 1}m ×Z. (242)
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It follows that
∀(~κ, v) ∈ I,
∣∣∣∣P~κ |v=v − 12m
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12m (2q + 2)h(δ, τf , pR, n), (243)
and
P~κv(I) =
∑
v∈R∩L
Pv(v)P~κ |v=v(Kv) (244)
=
∑
v∈R∩L
Pv(v) ∑
~κ∈Kv
P~κ |v=v(~κ)
 (245)
≥
∑
v∈R∩L
Pv(v) ∑
~κ∈Kv
1
2m
(1− (2q + 2)h(δ, τf , pR, n))
 (246)
≥
(
1− 1
q
)
(1− (2q + 2)h(δ, τf , pR, n)) Pv(R∩ L) (247)
≥
(
1− 1
q
)
(1− (2q + 2)h(δ, τf , pR, n))
(
Pv(P)− Pv(R∩ P)− Pv(L ∩ P)
)
(248)
≥ Pv(P)− Pv(R∩ P)− Pv(L ∩ P)− 1
q
− (2q + 2)h(δ, τf , pR, n). (249)
Now,
H(~κ|v) = −
∑
~κ,v
P~κv(~κ, v) log2 P~κ |v=v(~κ) (250)
= −
∑
~κ,v∈P
P~κv(~κ, v) log2 P~κ |v=v(~κ)−
∑
~κ,v∈P
P~κv(~κ, v) log2 P~κ |v=v(~κ). (251)
For any v ∈ P and ~κ ∈ {0, 1}m, we have P~κ |v=v(~κ) = 1/2m since Alice chooses randomly and
independently the value for ~κ when the validation test is not passed. Therefore,
H(~κ|v) = mPv(P)−
∑
~κ,v∈P
P~κv(~κ, v) log2 P~κ |v=v(~κ) (252)
≥ mPv(P)−
∑
(~κ,v)∈I
P~κv(~κ, v) log2 P~κ |v=v(~κ) (253)
since for any v and ~κ, − log2 P~κ |v=v(~κ) is nonnegative. Using the relation:
∀(~κ, v) ∈ I, P~κ |v=v(~κ) = 1
2m
(1 + ξ~κ,v) (254)
where ξ~κ,v ≤ (2q + 2)h(δ, τf , pR, n) for any (~κ, v) ∈ I, we get
H(~κ|v) ≥ m (Pv(P) + P~κv(I))− ∑
(~κ,v)∈I
P~κv(~κ, v) log2(1 + ξ~κ,v) (255)
≥ m
(
1− Pv(R∩ P)− Pv(L ∩ P)− 1
q
− (2q + 2)h(δ, τf , pR, n)
)
−
− 1
ln 2
(2q + 2)h(δ, τf , pR, n) (256)
= m−
(
m+
1
ln 2
)
(2q + 2)h(δ, τf , pR, n)− m
q
−m(Pv(R∩ P) + Pv(L ∩ P)) (257)
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where we used Equation (249) and the inequality log2(1 + x) ≤ |x|ln 2 for any x > −1.
The above inequality holds for any positive real number q ≥ 1. Especially it holds for
q =
√
m
2
(
m+ 1ln 2
)
h(δ, τf , pR, n)
(258)
obtained by maximising the rhs. in Eqn. (257). We therefore obtain the bound on the conditional Shannon
entropy of the key ~κ given the view v
H(~κ|v) ≥ m− ǫ1(N,m) (259)
where
ǫ1(N,m) = 2
(
m+
1
ln 2
)
h(δ, τf , pR, n) + 2
√
2
(
m+
1
ln 2
)
mh(δ, τf , pR, n) +m
(
Pv(R∩ P) + Pv(L ∩ P)
)
.
(260)
This concludes the proof of privacy. ✷
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A Appendix: Binomial Tail Inequalities
The following properties have been used throughout this paper.
Property 13 Let α be a positive number such that 0 ≤ α ≤ 12 . Then∑
0≤i≤αn
(
n
i
)
≤ 2H1(α)n (261)
where H1(α) = −α log2 α− (1 − α) log2(1− α) is the binary entropy function.
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Property 14 Let p, t be positive number such that 0 < p ≤ p+ t < 1. Then∑
(p+t)n≤i≤n
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i ≤ e−2t2n. (262)
Property 15 Let p, t be positive number such that 0 < p− t ≤ p < 1. Then∑
0≤i≤(p−t)n
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i ≤ e−2t2n. (263)
Property 16 Let A be a set of size |A|. Let B be a set. Suppose each element of A is contained in B
with probability p. Let τ be a positive number such that 0 < p− τ < p < p+ τ < 1 . Then the probability
that B contains more than (p+ τ)|A| elements of A (i.e. |A ∩B| ≥ (p+ τ)|A|) is bounded by
Pr(|A ∩B| ≥ (p+ τ)|A|) ≤ exp[−2τ2|A|]. (264)
Likewise, the probability that B contains less than (p− τ)|A| elements of A is bounded by
Pr(|A ∩B| ≤ (p− τ)|A|) ≤ exp[−2τ2|A|]. (265)
Proof [24] Suppose 0 ≤ p ≤ p+ t ≤ 1, q = 1− p. For any x ≥ 1, we have∑
k≤i≤n
(
n
i
)
piqn−i ≤
∑
k≤i≤n
(
n
i
)
piqn−ixi−k
≤
∑
0≤i≤n
(
n
i
)
piqn−ixi−k
=
1
xk
(q + px)n
≤ 1
x(p+t)n
(q + px)n
where k = ⌈(p + t)n⌉. The minimum of the last expression as function of x (x ≥ 1) is reached for
~x = q(p+t)p(q−t) and the above inequality gives
∑
k≤i≤n
(
n
i
)
piqn−i ≤
[(
p
p+ t
)p+t(
q
q − t
)q−t]n
(266)
The inequality above reads, for p = 1/2 (therefore q = 1/2) and t = β−1/2 where β = 1−α ∈ [1/2, 1],∑
βn≤i≤n
(
n
i
)
≤ 2nh(β). (267)
Using the identity (
n
i
)
=
n!
(n− i)!i! =
(
n
n− i
)
(268)
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and remarking that H1(α) = H1(1 − β) = H1(β), we get Property 13:
∀0 ≤ α ≤ 1
2
,
∑
0≤i≤αn
(
n
i
)
≤ 2H1(α)n. (269)
Let’s write (266) as ∑
k≤i≤n
(
n
i
)
piqn−i ≤ eng(t) (270)
where
g(t) = ln
[(
p
p+ t
)p+t(
q
q − t
)q−t]
. (271)
Then g is C∞ on [0, q[, and applying Taylor’s formula at order 2, we get
g(t) = g(0) + tg′(0) +
∫ t
0
g′′(u)(t− u)du. (272)
It is easy to check that g(0) = g′(0) = 0 and that g′′(u) = − 1(p+u)(q−u) ≤ −4 for any u ∈]0, q[. Therefore
g(t) =
∫ t
0
g′′(u)(t− u)du
≤ −4
∫ t
0
(t− u)du
≤ −2t2.
Since the exponential function is monotonically increasing, we get
eg(t) ≤ e−2t2 , (273)
therefore ∑
(p+t)n≤i≤n
(
n
i
)
piqn−i ≤ e−2t2n (274)
which gives Property 14.
Suppose now that 0 < p− t ≤ p < 1. Using the Identity (268), we get∑
0≤i≤(p−t)n
(
n
i
)
piqn−i =
∑
0≤i≤(p−t)n
(
n
n− i
)
qn−ipi
=
∑
n−(p−t)n≤j≤n
(
n
j
)
qjpn−j
=
∑
(q+t)n≤j≤n
(
n
j
)
qjpn−j ,
46
where 0 < q ≤ q + t < 1. Applying Property 14, we get∑
0≤i≤(p−t)n
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i ≤ e−2t2n (275)
which concludes the proofs for the binomial tail inequalities. We now prove Property 16.
The probability that B contains exactly k elements of A, for 0 ≤ k ≤ |A|, reads
Pr(|A ∩B| = k) =
(|A|
k
)
pk(1 − p)|A|−k. (276)
Therefore, the probability that A contains more than (p+ τ)|A| elements of A reads
Pr(|A ∩B| ≥ (p+ τ)|A|) =
∑
(p+τ)n≤k≤|A|
Pr(|A ∩B| = k) (277)
=
∑
(p+τ)n≤k≤|A|
(|A|
k
)
pk(1 − p)|A|−k (278)
≤ exp[−2τ2|A|], (279)
using the binomial tail inequality (Property 14). Likewise, the probability that A contains less than
(p− τ)|A| elements of A reads
Pr(|A ∩B| ≤ (p− τ)|A|) =
∑
0≤k≤(p−τ)|A|
Pr(|A ∩B| = k) (280)
=
∑
0≤k≤(p−τ)|A|
(|A|
k
)
pk(1− p)|A|−k (281)
≤ exp[−2τ2|A|], (282)
using the binomial tail inequality (Property 15). This concludes the proof. ✷
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